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The interactive features of social media platforms facilitate communication between political institutions and citizens and are said to 
enhance democracy by strengthening the public sphere. On the other hand, the commercialization of social networks and 
fragmentation of the public, together with the current mediatization of political communication, undermine the democratic 
possibilities of online platforms. Nowadays, the main social media platforms are owned by large US-based corporations with 
economic interests that often come into conflict with the public values promoted by EU institutions. Moreover, European institutions 
have the challenge of being often portrayed as non-transparent and remaining underrepresented in mass media. For that matter, 
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Qualitative content analysis and thematic analysis have been used as methods to assess the images and videos published on the 
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The results of the analysis suggest that the communication strategy of the European institutions on Instagram is rather based on 
one-directional and top-down communication, accordingly with the findings of previous research. The European Parliament and the 
European Commission mostly use Instagram to inform citizens about their policy and to promote European values, instead of 
engaging in democratic deliberation and strengthening political participation. Furthermore, the building of the European identity 
appears to be a central aspect of the communication strategy of the analyzed institutions, often together with personalization and 
explicit reference to users. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Presentation of the topic and relevance of the research 
 
In recent years, social media have become an essential part of political communication 
in Western democracies, at the same time that they have become one of the main plat-
forms for communication and socialization, particularly among young people. Due to 
the increasing popularity of “identity-centric social media platforms”, political actors 
and institutions have adopted social networks as part of their communication strategy 
(Klinger and Svensson, 2014: 1245; Lalancette and Raynauld, 2017: 6). The interactive 
features and the network structure of social media allow citizens and political institu-
tions to communicate directly with each other, becoming less dependent on intermedia-
ries such as mass media (Criado, Sandoval-Almazan and Gil-Garcia, 2013: 320). More-
over, the technological characteristics of online platforms also make bringing political 
discussion outside of national contexts possible (Castells, 2008: 81). However, the most 
successful social media platforms are owned by “the Big Five”, a few US based large 
corporations that dominate the online space while promoting “economic values and cor-
porate interests, often at the expense of a (European) focus on social values and collec-
tive interests” (Van Dijk, Poell and de Waal, 2018: 32, 138).  
Indeed, although the characteristics of social media make political communication more 
accessible, this does not always imply that those platforms improve democratic partici-
pation and access to information. Social media can also be used to expand disinforma-
tion, political propaganda and populist discourses. For example, during the Brexit refe-
rendum supporters were much more active than opponents spreading information on 
Twitter, Facebook and Instagram. In another context, during the US 2016 presidential 
elections foreign online propaganda was said to play a big role in the election results. 
The impact of these discourses has become more amplified due to the current delegiti-
mization of traditional political institutions (Persily, 2017: 64). 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze how European institutions are portraying them-
selves and how do they communicate with citizens in the context of social media. The 
institutions that will be analyzed are the European Parliament and the European Com-
mission, since they are the most active central EU institutions on Instagram. In particu-
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lar, qualitative content analysis and thematic analysis will be used in order to analyze 
the images and videos posted by the mentioned accounts in their Instagram profiles.  
Instagram is one of the most used social media platforms nowadays, currently owned by 
Facebook (Glantz, 2013: 694). Moreover, it is especially popular among young people 
(Liebhart and Bernhardt, 2017: 4; Smith and Anderson, 2008). However, political 
communication does not stand out among its uses, and therefore the platform has re-
mained fairly unanalyzed in the field (Lalancette and Raynauld, 2017: 7; Russmann and 
Svensson, 2016: 2).  
EU political actors, as well as institutions and organizations, have a strong presence in 
various social media platforms, including Instagram1. Due to the fact that analyses of 
political communication in the context of social media have focused mostly on actors at 
a national level, there is a lack of research about transnational and international institu-
tions. European institutions are an interesting object of analysis because they are hierar-
chically structured political institutions, but still make use of social networks based on 
horizontal types of communication (European Commission, 2013: 11). Moreover, they 
have the challenge of being often portrayed as non-transparent and having remained 
underrepresented in mass media (Karantzeni and Gouscos, 2013: 479-481). For that 
matter, having a better insight into how EU institutions present themselves on those 
platforms is relevant in order to understand which values they intend to promote and 
how do they interact with young citizens. 
Specifically, this thesis will focus on Instagram, since it is a social media platform 
based mostly on the publication of visual content, which will be at the center of this 
analysis. Although images and videos have also gained relevance in other major social 
networks, such as Facebook and Twitter, they are not the central aspect of those plat-
forms, which are still rather text-based. Studying political communication on Instagram 
allows focusing on the visual self-representation of the institutions, instead of on the 
visual framing of mass media, which has been the main focus of previous research 
about the role of visuality in political communication (Filmanov, Russmann and Svens-
son, 2016: 2). In Lalancette and Raynauld’s words, “visual content is becoming a cen-
tral component of formal political players’ digital political communication, mobiliza-
tion, and persuasion arsenal” (Lalancette and Raynauld, 2017: 3).  
                                                             
1EU social media accounts: https://europa.eu/european-union/contact/social-networks_en 
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Undoubtedly, pictures and videos can help influence the way citizens view political 
institutions and may affect the public opinion about them (Filmanov et al. 2016: 3). On 
the other hand, the interactive possibilities of social media make it easier for institutions 
to engage in conversation with citizens, and communicate directly without the need of 
intermediaries such as mass media; accordingly, institutions can decide how they want 
to reshape their own image (Marland, 2012: 215-217). Particularly nowadays, when 
visual and audiovisual content is gaining more relevance and social media platforms 
have consolidated as mainstream communication platforms for political actors, analyz-
ing how political institutions make use of Instagram is crucial in order to be able to in-
terpret what image they are trying to portray and in which ways do they engage with 
citizens (Russmann and Svensson, 2016: 1-2).  
In order to assess the role of Instagram in political communication, it is crucial to un-
derstand how the Internet and social media are shaping political communication and 
vice versa. For that reason, two broader theoretical perspectives regarding the democrat-
ic role of online platforms have been identified, which will be further explored in the 
theoretical framework chapter of this thesis. The first perspective claims that the trans-
formative power of the Internet is limited in terms of how it affects politics, since politi-
cal communication online merely reflects the power structures offline. In Dahlgren’s 
words, “while the major political actors may engage in online campaigning, lobbying, 
policy advocacy, organizing, and so forth, this perspective underscores that there does 
not seem to be any major political change in sight” (Dahlgren, 2005: 154). 
The second perspective views the Internet as a central platform to develop an online 
public sphere, with new types of democratic participation more tied to citizen advocacy 
and social movements. The main argument of this perspective is that the Internet fosters 
horizontal types of communication and makes citizen interactions between themselves 
and with political actors more accessible (Dahlgren, 2005: 154-155). In a similar way, 
Loader and Mercea identify two phases in the research on political communication on-
line: a “first wave of enthusiasm for internet-based visions of digital democracy” and a 
second wave in which rational deliberation is replaced for “identity politics” and net-
working between citizens (Loader and Mercea, 2011: 757-758).  
According to Liebhart and Bernhardt, the changes that social media has fostered in po-
litical communication can be summarized in three levels. At an organizational level, 
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there has been a considerable increase in the costs of campaigns due to their professio-
nalization and need to be in a constant campaign mode. At the level of content, social 
media algorithms make it possible for political communication to become more perso-
nalized and individualized. Finally, at a technological level, social networks make 
communication more accessible: politicians and institutions can communicate directly 
with citizens, without the need to use traditional mass media (Liebhart and Bernhardt, 
2017: 2-3). In the following chapters of this thesis, the effects of these changes, in par-
ticular at the level of content, will be assessed regarding political communication on 
social media, and specifically in relation with the self-representation of European insti-
tutions on Instagram. 
1.2. Research questions  
 
The research questions that will be examined within this thesis are the following:  
1. In which ways do European political institutions use Instagram to communicate 
with citizens and how do they portray themselves on the platform? 
2. What are the differences, in terms of content, between the use of the Stories 
function and the regular posts? 
3. How do the interactive features of Instagram affect the institutions’ democratic 
deliberation with users? 
The aim of the first question is to analyze the content posted by the European Parlia-
ment and the European Commission in a way that shows their particular manner of 
communicating on Instagram. Instagram is a platform mainly used by young people: 
according to a survey conducted by the Pew Research Center, in the US approximately 
71% of Instagram users are between 18 and 24 years old (Smith and Anderson, 2008: 
24). Although there is no data on the European context, this report gives an idea of 
which age groups use the social media platform the most. It will indeed be interesting to 
observe if the European political institutions present themselves in ways engaging for 
young people. Other relevant features to take into consideration will be whether the Eu-
ropean institutions use Instagram to broadcast information or mobilize users, if there is 
personalization in the content they post, and if values of European identity are noticea-
ble in the content, among other aspects. 
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The second research question is also rather empirical and refers specifically to the par-
ticular purposes for which the institutions use Stories (content available for 24 hours) 
and regular posts on their Instagram profiles. Political uses of the Stories function have 
not been analyzed yet, despite it being one of the most widely used features on Insta-
gram both by individual users and organizations (Statista, 2008). In fact, the analyzed 
European institutions published Stories almost on a daily basis during the data collec-
tion period. Moreover, the Stories function includes various interactive features which 
are not available in regular posts, but that are interesting to analyze from a perspective 
of political communication. For instance, Stories offer the possibility to add polls, ques-
tions and ratings to the content, among other elements, that political institutions may use 
to interact with citizens and receive direct feedback from users. For those reasons, ana-
lyzing the use of Stories of the European Parliament and the European Commission, in 
comparison with regular posts, is highly relevant in order to assess how these political 
institutions use Instagram to communicate with citizens. 
Finally, the aim of the third research question is to determine whether the analyzed in-
stitutions are making use of the interactive possibilities of Instagram in order to engage 
in democratic deliberation with young citizens, or whether they are otherwise using In-
stagram as a mere advertising platform. This question is therefore rather theoretically 
motivated. In this context, the concept of democratic deliberation is understood as the 
process of meaningful political discussion between citizens and institutions that takes 
place in the public sphere. Democratic deliberation is characterized by its “reflexive 
character”, meaning that all actors that take part in the discussion (both government and 
citizens) can reconsider their attitude towards the public opinions and respond to them 
(Habermas, 2006: 417). According to this perspective, I consider social media to have 
democratic possibilities, therefore having the potential to constitute a public sphere. 
This does not imply that commercial interests are disregarded as an important part of 
social media, or that these platforms cannot entail other types of communication which 
are not democratic by nature. However, in this research project I want to highlight how 
the interactive possibilities of social media platforms make it possible to include demo-
cratic deliberation within its usages. The interactive potential of Instagram will be fur-
ther described in the third section of this thesis, along with other relevant characteristics 
of the social network. 
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In order to examine the above presented research questions, images and videos pub-
lished on Instagram by the European Parliament and the European Commission, as well 
as their captions, have been collected during a period of 30 days and analyzed using 
qualitative content analysis and thematic analysis. These methods have been selected 
because they are adaptable to the research questions of this thesis and allow exploring 
the content in depth. Finally, the data sample includes both regular posts and Stories, 
which have been coded for analysis according to the four variables presented by Russ-
mann and Svensson in their article Studying Organizations on Instagram (2016). These 
variables, which will be defined in the methodology and data chapter, include percep-
tion, image management, integration and interactivity.  
1.3. Structure of the research 
This research project consists of six chapters, including this introductory section. In the 
following chapter, the theoretical background for the research will be developed. First 
of all, the concept of public sphere will be defined. Secondly, different theories about 
political communication in social media will be presented. Two main perspectives will 
be discussed; on the one hand the democratic role of social media as a public sphere, 
and on the other hand the commercial interests and risks of disinformation that those 
platforms entail.  
The third chapter will consist in a brief overview of previous research about the social 
media communication strategies of European institutions. The fourth chapter, metho-
dology and data, will start with a discussion on the relevance of Instagram as a research 
platform and visual communication as a relevant approach for conducting research in 
political communication. Subsequently, the research design and the methods of analysis 
will be presented, and the processes of data collection and analysis will be described in 
detail. Furthermore, the methodology section will discuss the validity and reliability of 
the research project, and possible ethical considerations of performing content analysis 
on social media.  
In the analysis part, the fifth chapter of the thesis, the findings of the data analysis will 
be displayed and explained, according to the coding schemes defined in the previous 
section. The analysis will focus on different aspects of perception, image management, 
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integration and interactivity of the content published by the European Commission and 
the European Parliament on their Instagram profiles.  
The last section of this thesis will be the discussion of the results and conclusions. In 
this chapter, the most relevant findings from the analysis will be discussed in relation 
with the research questions. Moreover, the contributions and limitations of the research 
will be exposed, along with recommendations for future research.  
 
 
2. Theoretical framework 
2.1. The concept of public sphere 
 
Jürgen Habermas defined the public sphere as a space of interaction between citizens 
and political institutions in democratic states. Processes of democratic deliberation are 
rather intersubjective, and take place in the shape of formal political discussion as well 
as in the informal networks of the public sphere (Habermas, 1994: 7-8). On the one 
hand, political institutions that hold the administrative power take into account the de-
mands of citizens, organized in the form of public opinion, in order to take decisions 
and develop policies (Habermas, 1994: 8-9). On the other hand, in the government con-
text, public opinions “set the frame” for which issues are relevant to citizens and which 
decisions they would consider legitimate (Habermas, 2006: 418). Social media are an 
interesting example from the perspective of the public sphere since they make possible 
informal discussion among citizens, and at the same time facilitate the process of com-
munication between democratic institutions and civil society, without the need for any 
intermediaries such as mass media. 
The two conditions that need to be fulfilled in order to have a public sphere are a trans-
parent and independent media, and “an inclusive civil society” which allows all citizens 
to participate in the public discussion on equal measure. However, in contemporary 
Western societies there is a lack of such characteristics. In Habermas’ words, “the litera-
ture on ‘public ignorance’ paints a rather sobering portrait of the average citizen as a 
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largely uninformed and disinterested person” (Habermas, 2006: 420). Habermas identi-
fies two main problems that negatively affect the deliberation process in the public 
sphere. Firstly, the fact that some citizens are socially and culturally excluded is directly 
related to the fact that opportunities of access and participation in mediated communica-
tion are unequal. Secondly, the fact that market logic leads the communication 
processes in the public sphere is affecting the structure and discourse of media. Mass 
media fosters attitudes of apathy and indifference by presenting content “of a degenerat-
ing kind of political communication itself”, which is based on entertainment: trends 
such as personalization, simplification, dramatization and polarization are all part of this 
marketing framing of political issues present in the media (Habermas, 2006: 421-422). 
Moreover, in Dahlgren’s view, “the political and politics are not simply given, but are 
constructed via word and deed”, and therefore public discussion may or may not take 
the form of deliberation (Dahlgren, 2005: 158). 
2.1.1. Public space vs. public sphere 
 
The concept of public sphere should not be confused with the notion of public space, 
especially in the online context. It is particularly relevant to distinguish both concepts 
when researching political communication on social media, because the interactive fea-
tures of social networks can be easily identified as promoting the creation of a public 
sphere, while in many cases they merely constitute a public space. When referring to the 
Internet as a public space, it is understood as a “forum for political deliberation”. How-
ever, as a public sphere the Internet does not only facilitate political discussion, but also 
promotes “a democratic exchange of ideas” (Papacharissi, 2002: 11). What distinguish-
es each one from the other is the fact that the public sphere serves as a mediator be-
tween society and the State, in which the public opinion is formed by rational delibera-
tion of a “reasoning public” (Habermas in Papacharissi, 2008: 5). On the other hand, in 
a public space individuals solely express their opinions.  
Similarly to discussions in real life, virtual political debates are often dominated by a 
few and do not have a relevant impact on “public policy formation” (Papacharissi, 2002: 
13). That implies that online platforms are merely additional spaces for political expres-
sion, and do not have the potential of changing the structure of the current political sys-
tem. In Papacharissi’s words, “greater participation in political discussion does not au-
tomatically result in discussion that promotes democratic ideals” (Papacharissi, 2002: 
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16). For example, it is true that social networks facilitate direct interaction and discus-
sion between political actors or institutions and citizens, but that does not necessarily 
entail that all political interactions on social media are democratic. 
The features of the public space are indeed necessary for the existence of a public 
sphere: the public space facilitates the creation of a public sphere by promoting political 
discussion between citizens and representatives and providing a better access to infor-
mation. However, these features do not always guarantee “a healthy public sphere” (Pa-
pacharissi, 2008: 5). Not all citizens have equal access to ICTs and, even if they do have 
access to them, that does not imply that they are more informed or that they have a 
higher level of civic engagement and are willing to participate in political processes 
(Papacharissi, 2002: 22-23; 2008: 8-9). According to Papacharissi, the online space is 
currently a public space, but not a public sphere: it does provide opportunities for politi-
cal deliberation; however it does not “promote a democratic exchange of ideas and opi-
nions”, and tends to reflect the power structures which are already present offline (Pa-
pacharissi, 2002: 11).  
The reasons why the transition from a public space to a public sphere has not happened 
can be summarized in three elements, which Papacharissi describes as “access to infor-
mation, reciprocity of communication, and commercialization” (Papacharissi, 2008: 12). 
Regarding the access to information, although initially digital media was thought to 
enhance direct democracy through “the deliberative discourse of public affairs”, later 
research indicated that citizens still inform themselves online through websites of tradi-
tional mass media organizations, rather than “Internet based news organizations” (Papa-
charissi, 2008: 16-17). Regarding the reciprocity in online media, although this feature 
allows further interaction between citizens, politicians and institutions, “uses of digital 
media by politicians and the media tend to be one-directional and do not sustain feed-
back channels for the digital public or enable substantive citizen involvement” (Papa-
charissi, 2008: 17-18). Politicians and institutions, therefore, tend to use online media 
merely to support their own agendas and objectives. Finally, regarding the commerciali-
zation of digital media, it is inevitable that these media become commoditized and 
commercialized as they are part of the capitalist market and mostly owned by large cor-
porations (Papacharissi, 2008: 21). 
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2.2. Political communication online 
 
Political communication as a research field emerged in the US during the first half of 
the 20th century, in close relation with the development of mass media and communica-
tion studies. The existence of a free press and an informed civil society were considered 
necessary aspects for a healthy democracy already at the beginnings of political com-
munication. During the first decades, research tended to concentrate on studying propa-
ganda and its effects, especially since it developed within the context of the 1st and 2nd 
World Wars, in which propaganda had an important role (Rogers, 2004: 4). For exam-
ple, Lasswell and Doob explored in which ways governments used persuasive means of 
communication to “influence public opinion”. On the other hand, Lippmann focused on 
the effects that the press and the government had on public opinion, and on the conse-
quences of the agenda-setting in political processes (Lin, 2004: 70-71). 
Within the last century, television in the 1950s and the Internet in the 1990s represented 
a big change of channels of political communication. However, although the platforms 
of communication have shifted noticeably, the processes of interaction and political 
persuasion have remained similar (Rogers, 2004: 3). Due to the visual features of televi-
sion, “in which faces are more easily recognizable by and accessible to mass audiences 
than abstract arguments about policies”, broadcasting media promoted a change of the 
political discourse from beliefs and ideas to “personalities and spectacle”, therefore con-
tributing to the “depoliticization” of politics. Broadcast communication has also tres-
passed the public domain of political communication, by bringing it in the private space 
of “the living room”. Moreover, television promoted the further professionalization of 
political communication, necessary to adapt the image and discourse of political actors 
to the broadcast medium (Gurevitch, Coleman and Blumler, 2009: 166-167).  
As it is the case with new media, in its origins television was said to have a big contri-
bution in the creation of a “more informed, inclusive, and nonpartisan democracy” (Gu-
revitch, Coleman and Blumler, 2009: 164). Indeed, early research about political com-
munication on the broadcast medium proved that citizens were more informed regarding 
campaign and policy issues. However, as television became settled, the medium started 
becoming more dependant and, at the same time, necessary for politics, allowing politi-
cal actors to gain more control over their messages (Gurevitch et al. 2009: 165). 
11 
 
 
 
As in the start of television, the arrival of the Internet has prompted both optimistic and 
skeptical views. On the one side, some consider the online space beneficial for democ-
racy since it enhances political participation; while at the same time, skeptics consider it 
just a tool to reinforce already existing political communication mechanisms (Tedesco, 
2004: 507-508). One of the main features of the Internet that differentiates if from tradi-
tional mass media is that it allows citizens to communicate and access information 
without time or space limitations. It is an appealing medium for political actors and or-
ganizations because it represents a “source-controlled” communication channel, which 
is cheaper than advertisements and offers unlimited space to express themselves and 
share political information (Tedesco, 2004: 510). Nonetheless, the current media struc-
ture may present a threat to the existence of an online public sphere. Mass media, and 
especially television, has been said to contribute to “public cynicism” and to a decrease 
in traditional political functions “such as party alignment and voting”, so applying the 
broadcast model to the online context does not necessarily mean that citizens would 
become more engaged and active in politics (Tedesco, 2004: 516). 
With the arrival of the Internet in the field of political communication, more information 
is available to citizens; therefore values such as professionalization, pluralism and citi-
zen involvement are gaining relevance (Vesnic-Alujevic, 2013: 18). It is important for 
political actors, such as democratic institutions, to be available to portray these values to 
the public in order to appear more reliable and transparent. In many cases, this is 
achieved by using politicians’ “celebrity appeal” and portraying a more personal image, 
while making use of communication techniques from popular culture, such as marketing 
and entertainment. At the same time, there is a growing trend in campaigning and in 
news media to focus on individual politicians, rather than on institutions and policies 
(Loader, Vromen and Xenos, 2016: 405). According to Gurevitch, Coleman and Blum-
ler, the online space has allowed the expansion of the range of political sources, by in-
cluding aspects such as celebrity behavior or reality TV conflicts, and at the same time 
departing from formal politics and professionalized political communication (Gurevitch 
et al. 2009: 171-172). The following quote summarizes the effects of the new media 
landscape for political actors:  
The digital text is never complete; the fluidity of bits and bytes makes digital 
communication radically different from broadcasting. In the context of political 
communication, this has entailed a profound shift in the process of message cir-
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culation. Whereas political actors were once concerned to produce polished, fi-
nished performances for public consumption, contemporary politicians are com-
pelled to think about interactive audiences and their capacity to question, chal-
lenge, redistribute, and modify the messages that they receive. In the era of digi-
tal interactivity, the production of political messages and images is much more 
vulnerable to disruption at the point of reception. (Gurevitch et al. 2009: 171) 
 
Interactivity is not new, nor a feature exclusive to the Internet; it already existed in mass 
media, for example in the form of radio phone-ins in the context of television and radio. 
However, interactivity is a central aspect of digital media, and defines its characteristics 
as a multi-directional communication platform. Moreover, as much as interactivity af-
fects political communication online, so does the possibility to modify messages and 
content in the online space (Gurevitch et al. 2009: 171-172).  
While in the past, political communication unfolded in the limited spaces of press, tele-
vision and radio, strategists are nowadays involved in “multidimensional impression 
management”, since political actors have to be present in many different “spaces of 
mediation”. In this new situation, politicians and governments have less control on the 
political agenda, to which they have to be “increasingly responsive”. Political actors 
also have to adapt to a very wide, dynamic and uncertain media environment. Finally, 
the interactive features of communication online have promoted further discussion be-
tween political actors, such as institutions and citizens (Gurevitch et al. 2009: 173-174). 
2.2.1. The democratic role of social media 
2.2.1.1. The online public sphere 
 
In the 1990s, discussions about the decrease of the quality of democracy were develop-
ing at the same time than discussions about the “media revolution” of the Internet. In 
that context, some started viewing these new technologies as possible solutions for en-
couraging democratic values and developing new forms of democratic participation 
closer to citizens (Dahlgren, 2005: 150). Early studies of digital democracy, therefore, 
tended to focus on the deliberative and participatory possibilities of Information and 
Communication Technologies (ICTs). Mark Poster was one of the first to apply the 
concept of public sphere in the online context, as the following quotation demonstrates: 
To frame the issue of the political nature of the Internet in relation to the concept 
of the public sphere is particularly appropriate because of the spatial metaphor 
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associated with the term. Instead of an immediate reference to the structure of an 
institution, which is often a formalist argument over procedures, or to the claims 
of a given social group, which assumes a certain figure of agency that I would 
like to keep in suspense, the notion of a public sphere suggests an arena of ex-
change. (Poster, 1995: 5) 
In a similar way, Shirky considers the Internet as a communication platform supporting 
the public sphere and civil society, because of its participation, networking and inform-
ing characteristics. The concept of “environmental”, applied to the online space, is re-
lated to the fact that “positive changes in the life of a country, including pro-democratic 
regime change, follow, rather than precede, the development of a strong public sphere” 
(Shirky, 2011: 17-18). In Shirky’s view, public opinion is based on media and conversa-
tion; it is the step in which the opinions are shared between people that is most relevant 
for the formation of public opinions, and in which the Internet has a major role (Shirky, 
2011: 19).  
Manuel Castells embraced the democratic qualities of social media platforms, by trans-
posing the concept of public sphere to the context of the Web 2.0. Based on Habermas’ 
theory of democracy, he defines the public sphere as “the space where people come 
together as citizens and articulate their autonomous views to influence the political in-
stitutions of society” (Castells, 2008: 78-79). According to Castells, communication 
networks such as social media are, therefore, part of the public sphere. Furthermore, the 
technological characteristics of ICTs allow, among other things, creating a global public 
sphere that brings the political discussion out of the national context (Castells, 2008: 
81).  
Following the discourse theory proposed by Habermas, therefore, social media may be 
considered as an “informal network” part of the public sphere, in which citizens can 
articulate their demands. Moreover, in this view, social media platforms may foster 
democratic processes further than traditional means of communication, because they are 
also channels of direct interaction between the civil society and the political administra-
tion. In the context of institutional communication, social media can be defined as “a 
group of technologies that allow public agencies to foster engagement with citizens and 
other organizations using the philosophy of Web 2.0.” (Criado, Sandoval-Almazan and 
Gil-Garcia, 2013: 320).  
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Even though he does not specifically focus on social media, Dahlberg identifies three 
different frames in relation with the use of the Internet for democratic purposes. First of 
all, a communitarian frame “which stresses the possibility of the Internet enhancing 
communal spirit and values”. Secondly, a liberal-individualist frame “which sees the 
Internet as assisting the expression of individual interests”. The third type is the deliber-
ative frame, based on Habermas’ theory, “which promotes the Internet as the means for 
an expansion of the public sphere of rational-critical citizen discourse” (Dahlberg, 2001: 
616).  
Although Dahlberg, as well as Loader and Mercea, view the fact that political sites tend 
to be owned by corporations or governments as a threat to the democratic opportunities 
that the Internet offers, they also consider that this should not overshadow the democrat-
ic possibilities of social media and the potential it has to “re-configure communicative 
power relations”, offering more possibilities of media production to citizens (Dahlberg, 
2001: 619; Loader and Mercea, 2011: 758). In particular, Dahlberg sees an opportunity 
for advancing online democracy in deliberative sites, such as citizen led initiatives, 
which extend the public sphere by “stimulating reflexivity, fostering respectful listening 
and participant commitment to ongoing dialogue, achieving open and honest exchange, 
providing equal opportunity for all voices to be heard, and maximizing autonomy from 
state and corporate interests” (Dahlberg, 2001: 627-628).  
Finally, Loader and Mercea argue that an open conception of “democratic citizenship”, 
recognizing that there can exist multiple identity positions of citizens, may consider that 
social media is positive for democratic participation in the sense that these platforms 
enable political engagement in the private space of communication. However, there is 
also skepticism to the fact that politics should be broadened to that extent. In a more 
traditional view of democracy and citizenship, social media can be seen to undermine 
“rational deliberation”, promoting populist discourses and the sensationalization of poli-
tics (Loader and Mercea, 2011: 761-762). 
2.2.1.2. Democratic deliberation on social media 
 
In many occasions, the democratizing potential of the Internet is related with characte-
ristics of the online space that enhance further participation, more equality and less hie-
rarchy. This approach is based on theories of participatory democracy and deliberative 
democracy, rather than on representative democracy. According to Storsul, “democratic 
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deliberation implies that more dialogue and less hierarchy may strengthen the collective 
shaping of politics through persuasive argument” (Storsul, 2014: 18-19). This view is 
based on Habermas’ theory of public sphere, according to which all citizens should have 
the same opportunities to take part in democratic deliberation processes (Habermas, 
2006: 421-422).  
While mass media, namely broadcast and press, facilitate the circulation of information 
and political deliberation, citizen participation in political processes on them is rather 
limited. On the other hand, the attributes of the Internet allow further direct interaction 
between equal users; to some extent, the online space decreases the “hierarchical dis-
tance” between ordinary citizens and political institutions. Most ideas about the poten-
tial of Internet for increasing participation and deliberation online also concern social 
media services. However, there are two aspects exclusive of social media which rein-
force democratic deliberation: inclusiveness and integration between mass media and 
personal media (Storsul, 2014: 19). 
Social media are inclusive in the sense that they involve different social roles. On the 
same platform, citizens can discuss diverse topics and present themselves in different 
manners. The inclusiveness of social media relates to the concept of public sphere pro-
posed by Habermas, in the sense that they represent spaces in which democratic delibe-
ration is possible. Nonetheless, social networks are not only used for public communi-
cation, but also for private purposes; they integrate both personal and mass media. Mass 
media are characterized by being asymmetrical, in the sense that one-way communica-
tion is predominant. On the other hand, personal media, such as telephones and e-mail 
are more symmetrical, because they allow communication between individuals in pri-
vate and non-institutional contexts. In social media, both types of communication are 
present: institutional actors can communicate with larger audiences, but users can also 
interact with each other individually (Storsul, 2014: 19-20). 
These two features are relevant for political participation and democratic deliberation at 
three different levels. Firstly, social media enable more people to participate in political 
processes and discussion, and those platforms are also useful for political actors to mo-
bilize citizens, due to their inclusiveness. Secondly, social media facilitate deliberation 
by “reducing hierarchies” between institutions and citizens. Thirdly, users of social me-
dia platforms have to present themselves according to different social roles. In Storsul’s 
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words, “the integration of communication forms and collapsed social contexts may, 
however, make such participation and deliberation complicated” (Storsul, 2014: 21).  
2.2.2. The downsides of social media 
 
Although, in 2005, Dahlgren embraces the democratic possibilities that the Internet pro-
vides for developing and transforming the public sphere, he is also aware that there are 
limitations in the deliberative characteristics of online communication, since the Internet 
is developing within the commercialization and market-logic model of traditional me-
dia, and political discussion itself does not always entail a deliberative and civic charac-
ter. Political uses of the Internet are very limited in comparison to other purposes the 
online space is used for, such as entertainment, consumerism, etc. Furthermore, the digi-
tal divide still exists, even within Western democracies, and although the Internet facili-
tates the development of a more heterogenic type of political communication, this also 
leads to the fragmentation of the public sphere. In short, even though online spaces, 
such as social networks, offer possibilities for new forms of interaction between institu-
tions and citizens as well as political participation, this impact should not be misunders-
tood as “a quick fix for democracy”, since interactions and communication on social 
media platforms are still very much shaped by the economic interests of the corpora-
tions that own them (Dahlgren, 2005: 151-152). In the following pages, the issues men-
tioned here will be further explored. 
2.2.2.1. Commercial interests  
 
According to Dahlgren, the public sphere does not equal democracy, since democracy 
does not only entail deliberation and information, but also a “structural connection” 
across the spaces in which interaction between citizens and institutions takes place and 
the actual political processes of decision making (Dahlgren, 2005: 152-153). The cur-
rent political system is very influenced by capitalist interests, and so is communication 
online. The main communication platforms on the Internet, including social networks, 
are characterized by being commercially oriented; although the Internet does provide 
opportunities for more democratic forms of expression, new technologies “cannot sin-
gle-handedly transform a political and economic structure that has thrived for centuries” 
(Papacharissi, 2002: 20). Dahlberg stresses that already present social conditions in the 
offline context also affect political participation online. For example, Internet costs and 
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computing skills are some of the inequalities that undermine participation in the online 
public sphere (Dahlberg, 2001: 628).  
Something that should be taken into consideration when analyzing the impact of online 
media in political communication is the fact that online platforms such as social media 
were not created with the main purpose to foster democratic values and promote politi-
cal deliberation; they are tools used for many different purposes, such as marketing and 
entertainment. Since social networks are neither democratic nor undemocratic by nature, 
they can be used either to promote democracy or undermine it, depending on the politi-
cal context (Persily, 2017: 74-75; Tucker et al. 2017: 48). In that sense, Fuchs criticizes 
the adoption of the concept of public sphere proposed by Habermas in the context of the 
Internet and social media, since these interpretations focus on “political and cultural 
communication”, but do not take into account the material and political economic as-
pects of online communication, by asking for example who owns social media plat-
forms (Fuchs, 2014: 57-58).  
Even though the Internet offers citizens the possibility of engaging in political discus-
sion, the effect of their opinions is quite limited, since “visibility on the Internet can be 
purchased and centralized”. Therefore, actors that are already in a position of power 
such as states and large companies will find it much easier than civil society to spread 
their messages online (Fuchs, Boersma, Albrechtslund, and Sandoval, 2012: 14). This 
situation is clear when looking at the “highly asymmetrical ownership structure” of the 
most popular web 2.0 online sites and social media platforms, such as Facebook, Twit-
ter, Instagram and Google. Most of them are owned by large corporations which make 
profit out of users’ data; they are not only communicative services, but also advertising 
agencies (Fuchs, 2014: 80). Indeed, the online space is dominated by the “Big Five plat-
form corporations”, a group formed by the US based tech companies Alphabet-Google, 
Facebook, Apple, Amazon, and Microsoft (Van Dijck, Poell, and de Waal, 2018: 12).   
The above presented corporations shape the technological infrastructure, economic 
model and ideological orientation of the online ecosystem, and decide the ways in 
which platforms, institutions and users interact with each other (Van Dijck, Poell, and 
de Waal, 2018: 32). For example, in the case of Instagram, the social network was pur-
chased by Facebook in 2012. Nowadays, Facebook owns 80% of “social networking 
services” and, together with Google, control more than 60% of online advertising and 
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online identification services, such as Facebook Login. Finally, Facebook has also ac-
quired considerable control over users’ information through different mobile applica-
tions, including Instagram (Van Dijck et al. 2018: 13). In this context, political actors 
have to adapt their online discourse to the characteristics of Facebook. Although there is 
no formal restriction to new platforms in the current ecosystem, the fact that it is domi-
nated by the “Big Five infrastructural platforms” makes extremely difficult for competi-
tion to enter the market without becoming dependent on the services already created by 
these corporations (Van Dijck et al. 2018: 15).  
The platform ecosystem created by the “Big Five” companies may seem to replace top-
down with bottom-up communication; however it does so “by means of a highly centra-
lized structure which remains opaque to its users” (Van Dijck, Poell, and de Waal, 
2018: 12). For instance, unlike traditional mass media such as television and radio, the 
Internet, and especially social media, offers users the possibility to become more active 
through its “many-to-many” type of communication. However, in the online context, 
users are not merely consumers or producers; instead they are “prosumers”, meaning 
that they are able to do both activities on the same platforms and the difference between 
them is becoming more blurred. The “prosumer commodity” of the Internet does not 
imply that online media are more participatory or democratic than traditional media, but 
that “human creativity” is becoming more commoditized. State and corporate power are 
exercised online, “through the gathering, combination, and assessment of personal data 
that users communicate over the web to others” (Fuchs, 2012: 56-58). 
Undoubtedly, the commodification of social media affects how political communication 
unfolds in the online context, as well as the other way around. For instance, institutions 
and politicians are able to target specific messages to different audiences by using real-
time analytics, which provide information about users’ preferences and popular topics 
which are being discussed on social networks (Van Dijck et al. 2018: 35). Moreover, as 
individual and institutional users use social media platforms to promote themselves, this 
also intensifies the data traffic and subsequently the commodification of data on those 
platforms, which is transformed into economical value through personalized advertising 
and transaction fees. In van Dijck, Poell, and de Waal’s words, “while user commodifi-
cation and platform commodification mutually reinforce each other, there is clearly a 
huge disparity in power relations”. Platform operators control the flows of data and al-
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gorithms which shape communicative processes through their infrastructures, so they 
can also decide the economic model they want to impose (Van Dijck et al. 2018: 40). 
Social media are part of the current process of “liquefaction” of society, according to 
which the distinctions between private life and public life, for instance work time and 
leisure time, are becoming more blurred. The liquefaction process has emerged due to 
certain developments in society, such as the trends towards globalization, the increased 
mobility of people and information, the deregulation of employment and the flexibility 
of production (Fuchs, 2014: 75). In that context, how are social networks related to the 
process of liquefaction? Firstly, “social media enable the convergence of the three mod-
es of sociality (cognition, communication, cooperation) into an integrated form of so-
ciality”. For example, a user of a certain social network can create and publish content 
on the platform (cognitive level), which other users can comment on (communicative 
level) and manipulate to create new content (cooperative level). Secondly, another fea-
ture of social media which relates to the liquefaction process of society is the fact that 
most platforms integrate different social roles, in the sense that social networks “are 
based on the creation of personal profiles that describe the various roles of a human 
being’s life”, such as friends, citizens, workers, etc. Furthermore, the process of lique-
faction has also blurred the boundaries between public and private spaces in political 
communication (Fuchs, 2014: 77). 
The fact that social media are communicative platforms with economic interests, and 
that their characteristics promote the liquefaction of society, has consequently created 
three antagonisms at an economical, political and social level. The first one is the eco-
nomic antagonism between users’ data protection and the demands of tax accountability 
of the corporations, and the economic interests of social media corporations and their 
lack of transparency. The second antagonism is the political antagonism between users’ 
privacy and demand of institutional accountability, and the “secrecy of power” and 
“surveillance-industrial complex” of the institutions. Finally, there is a third antagonism 
at the level of civil society between “the creation of public spheres and the corporate 
and state colonization of these public spheres” (Fuchs, 2014: 83-89).  
In short, although social media have the potential to become a public sphere, this ability 
is limited by the political and corporate powers which control and monitor users’ data in 
these platforms (Fuchs, 2014: 89). Institutional users, such as the European Commission 
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and the European Parliament, have to build their image in the current platform ecosys-
tem due to the extended popularity of US-based social media platforms (especially 
among young people). While, traditionally, institutions have had their own ethical crite-
ria, professional routines and formal procedures to shape their communication strategy, 
in the current context they have to adapt to new online platforms which challenge those 
procedures by means of commodification and selection techniques. This situation has 
brought numerous issues to political communication in democratic states, such as priva-
cy concerns and a decline of ethical integrity and public values (Van Dijck et al. 2018: 
47). It is therefore crucial to understand to which extent the current configuration of the 
platform ecosystem in the context of social media is affecting the public values of Eu-
ropean institutions. 
2.2.2.2. Fragmentation and manipulation of the public 
 
Democratic institutions, such as governments, are increasingly “reliant upon the corpo-
rate platform ecosystem” which dominates the online space. Therefore, it should be in 
the public interest to consider how these platforms could be used to enhance democratic 
values (Van Dijck et al. 2018: 146). Besides regulating social media platforms, institu-
tional actors can also uphold public values as users and developers of platforms (Van 
Dijck et al. 2018: 156). However, Poell and de Waal recognize that this can be a chal-
lenging task in the current context: 
Governments and publicly funded organizations function as exemplary users of 
platforms that should be held to the highest standards of transparency and ac-
countability. If government workers select corporate platforms to use in profes-
sional contexts, they are supposed to align their choices with reigning public 
values in their field. In the current platform ecosystem, though, they often have 
no choice but to succumb to built-in mechanisms, triggering fundamental ques-
tions about conflicting values. (Van Dijck et al. 2018: 159) 
 
Although political institutions may use social media platforms to enhance democratic 
values, the features of those platforms may not always support the same values. Indeed, 
beneficial aspects of the Internet for democracy, such as the possibilities it provides for 
promoting alternative and anti-establishment discourses, can also be a risk. As social 
networks become a means of expression for groups whose views are usually excluded 
from mainstream media and politics, not only “prodemocratic forces” use them to hold 
governments accountable, but authoritarian regimes also use online platforms to spread 
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their own propaganda, or directly censor them. More recently, “illiberal and antisystem 
forces” within democratic states, such as populists and demagogues, have started using 
tools of participation in the online space similar to those of authoritarian regimes to 
spread misinformation and manipulate public opinions, with the purpose of expanding 
their own discourses (Tucker et al. 2017: 47-48). Those tools include, among others, 
foreign intervention in elections and the prominence of fake news, which are made 
possible by the “anonymity and lack of accountability” of online speeches (Persily, 
2017: 71). Persily summarizes the challenges that the Internet poses for democracy in 
the following way: 
The politics of never-ending spectacles cannot be healthy for a democracy. Nor 
can a porousness to outside influences that undercuts the sovereignty of a na-
tion’s elections. Democracy depends on both the ability and the will of voters to 
base their political judgments on facts, or at least on strong intermediary institu-
tions that can act as guardrails to channel decision making within the broad 
range of democratic alternatives. (Persily, 2017: 72) 
 
There is clearly an absence of accountability in online platforms such as social media: 
while they facilitate direct communication between political actors and citizens, at the 
same time, traditional representative institutions and political parties are losing relev-
ance and voters are becoming more fragmented, making it easier to manipulate the pub-
lic opinion (Mazzoleni and Schulz, 1999: 248). The lack of transparency of social media 
platform owners regarding their data and governance model is part of the issue of ac-
countability. Social networks may promote disinformation and “filter bubbles”, which 
are clearly not in the public interest: the commercial values that control the “platform 
mechanisms of selection” can negatively affect democratic processes (Van Dijck et al. 
2018: 143-145). For instance, as the Internet allows targeting information according to 
the preferences of users, this situation creates a “communication bubble” in which citi-
zens only receive messages which match their political and personal affinities (Persily, 
2017: 72). Although democratic institutions may use social media in order to counteract 
misinformation, their communication effects are minimized by the characteristics of the 
platforms that enhance fragmentation.  
However, the fragmentation of the public and the lack of accountability are not the only 
challenges for democratic deliberation online. Mazzoleni and Schulz propose the con-
cept of “mediatized politics” to define situations in which political processes are becom-
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ing more dependent on to their interactions with media (Mazzoleni and Schulz, 1999: 
250). The 2016 US election represented a change in the way political communication 
was shaped online, and is a good example of mediatized politics. As traditional institu-
tions, such as mainstream media and political parties, were losing legitimacy and no 
alternative institutions were filling the void, “an unmediated populist nationalism tailor-
made for the Internet age” gained relevance and took their place (Persily, 2017: 64-66). 
Trump’s campaign was successful not only because it filled the void left by traditional 
media, but also because the characteristics of social media made it possible for it to be-
come viral. In Persily’s words, “those who worry about the implications of the 2016 
campaign are left to wonder whether it illustrates the vulnerabilities of democracy in the 
Internet age, especially when it comes to the integrity of the information voters will 
access as they choose between candidates” (Persily, 2017: 66-67).  
One of the main worries of the 2016 US elections were fake news. Their relevance can 
be explained by the fact that some fake stories generated more engagement than articles 
published in mainstream news sites. Moreover, in some occasions, even official cam-
paign channels would share fake stories on social media, especially Twitter (Persily, 
2017: 68). Fake news not only are powerful because they can change the attitude of vot-
ers, but also because they promote demobilization and cynicism among citizens regard-
ing political actors and institutions, creating “a blanket of fog that obscures the real 
news and information communicated by the campaigns” (Persily, 2017: 69). In brief, 
democratic deliberation on social media is negatively affected by different malpractices 
such as fake news, as a consequence of the lack of accountability, fragmentation of the 
public and mediatization of politics in the current platform ecosystem. 
According to van Dijck, Poell and de Waal, “if societies want to create a platform struc-
ture that reflects and constructs a democratic order, they need to strive to implement 
public values and collective interests in the ecosystem’s design”. However, the current 
ecosystem does not reflect those values. The European focus on “social values and col-
lective interests” often remains invisible in the online ecosystem, since it is dominated 
by US companies which merely seek economic profits and corporate interests (Van 
Dijck et al. 2018: 139). Governments should ideally assign different responsibilities to 
public, private and nonprofit platform operators and increase collaboration in order to 
promote “a platform society with checks and balances” that puts democratic values as a 
central aspect. In order to build a transparent and sustainable platform ecosystem, it is 
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important that all actors, including market, state and civil society, work together on its 
construction (Van Dijck et al. 2018: 161). 
 
 
3. European institutions on social media  
The use of social media for political communication and marketing purposes is a rela-
tively new phenomenon; it was first introduced in the US during the 2008 presidential 
elections, after which it extended to Europe (Vesnic-Alujevic, 2013: 12). The European 
Parliament (EP) was the first European institution to create social media accounts, dur-
ing the election campaign in 2009. At the moment, there are more than 15 EU institu-
tions with social media accounts in more than 10 different platforms and in different 
languages, as well as personal accounts for representatives of the EP, among other insti-
tutions. Hence, there has been a really rapid development of the use of social media in 
the European context (European Commission in Gaušis, 2017: 30-31). This develop-
ment goes hand in hand with the noticeable increase of participation rates in social me-
dia during the last years, especially by young people. According to Eurostat, in 2017 
half of the population between 16 and 29 years old in Europe used social media to inte-
ract with public authorities at least once (Eurostat, 2018). Therefore, social media plat-
forms provide a valuable opportunity for institutions to engage with young citizens 
(Gaušis, 2017: 31).  
To assess in which ways European institutions portray themselves on social media, it is 
important to take into consideration whether the institutions are trying to foster Euro-
pean citizenship, and in which ways they are working towards it. As stated by Richard 
Bellamy, citizenship can be identified by three elements: a sense of belonging to a 
community, citizen rights and political participation. While the “sense of belonging” is 
a rather subjective aspect, the rights of European citizens are indeed collected in EU 
treaties. The participation of citizens in the public sphere depends on the extent in which 
the other two components are present (Bellamy, 2008: 6).  
It is clear the EU intends to transcend national citizenships within member states by 
fostering transnational interests and new forms of political participation on a European 
24 
 
 
 
level; however, these new proposals may come into conflict with the already established 
values of national citizenships, as in the case of the diverse national rights that have 
been legitimated democratically in the past (Bellamy, 2008: 9-10). In those cases, the 
attempts of the EU to unify diversified national legislations may be viewed as illegiti-
mate by national citizens, especially if the processes are perceived as non-transparent 
and undemocratic (Bellamy, 2008: 29-30). According to Gaušis, citizens can only make 
use of their rights as Europeans if they are aware of how to use them; therefore, EU in-
stitutions have the moral obligation to inform citizens about “their rights, obligations 
and opportunities”. In that sense, social media may be an effective channel to communi-
cate European citizenship values, especially to young people, and appear more ap-
proachable and transparent (Gaušis, 2017: 29-30). As Karantzeni and Gouscos claim, 
“social networks could successfully bridge the gap between the citizens and the strict, 
hierarchical structure of the EU, consequently increasing its legitimacy through this 
kind of mediated proximity” (2013: 484). 
The concept of European identity or citizenship was developed as part of the EU politi-
cal agenda in the 1970s, to portray a sense of unity and common responsibility within 
the EU member states. Since the element that brings the members of the European 
Community together is not a “common cultural heritage”, but the self-identification 
“with a common political structure, based on common institutions, rules and rights”, the 
concept of European identity is based on civic rather than on cultural values. The EU 
has indeed created a “system of values” aimed at promoting the existence of a European 
citizenship, such as the common currency, the flag and the Chart of Fundamental Hu-
man Rights. However, the establishment of a European Public Sphere “through the 
promotion of a European identity” has failed to be successful due to the lack of legiti-
macy of the EU and the skepticism regarding citizen involvement in European political 
affairs. Moreover, Karantzeni and Gouscos highlight the role of mass media, which 
tends to present incomplete and fragmented information regarding the political activity 
in the EU, often appearing as secondary in comparison with national issues (Karantzeni 
and Gouscos, 2013: 479-481).  
This situation has lead European institutions to place a bigger emphasis on digital media 
in order to strengthen “citizen accessibility to European mechanisms and procedures” 
and to develop a European Public Sphere. Promoting eParticipation has become a cen-
tral part of the current EU communication policy, in order to make institutions appear 
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more transparent and approachable to citizens. In Karantzeni and Gouscos’s words, 
eParticipation can be defined as “information communication technologies (ICT) sup-
ported participation in processes involving citizens in government and governance”. It 
is important to note that although the EU has placed great efforts into promoting eParti-
cipation, this strategy has not managed to significantly improve digital participation of 
citizens at a European level. This could be explained due to the fact that it has been con-
ceived as a “one-way communication process”, not taking relevantly into account open 
interaction with citizens (Karantzeni and Gouscos, 2013: 481-482). 
Gaušis and Leston-Banderia both conducted analysis on the social media accounts of 
the European Parliament in 2013, focusing on Facebook and Twitter, with similar re-
sults. Both studies show that the institution was already quite active on social media at 
the time; nonetheless, the possibilities offered by these platforms were not fully ex-
ploited, as the type of communication that prevailed was mostly “top-down” and “one-
to-many”, similarly to the uses of traditional mass media communication channels, and 
the type of content published was mainly informative (Gaušis, 2017: 37; Leston-
Bandeira, 2013: 9-10). Even though there was public engagement to some extent, which 
Leston-Bandeira explains as due to the lower levels of awareness and legitimacy of the 
EP in comparison with most national parliaments in their analysis, interactivity with 
citizens was not frequently present (Leston-Bandeira, 2013: 12-15). Likewise, Karant-
zeni and Gouscos observed that social media were used by EU institutions in a rather 
“formalistic approach” and limited to “a top-down information sharing process and fo-
cused on a continuous upload of latest news and official rhetoric”, that could be unders-
tood by citizens as a way to advertise the institutions rather than providing citizens with 
a mechanism to become more active and involved in the processes of the EU (Karantze-
ni and Gouscos, 2013:  491). 
In 2013, the European Commission issued a report about the use of social media for 
organizations. When looking specifically at “online public services”, the report points 
out that “although over the last decade, EU governments have invested heavily in ICT-
enabled public services and despite the emergence of a multitude of social networking 
and social media services, the take-up has been relatively low and the anticipated trans-
formation of the administration not as extensive as predicted” (European Commission, 
2013: 9). The main challenge of social media for public organizations, according to the 
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report, is the clash of the hierarchical “organizational structures” with the social net-
work structure (European Commission, 2013: 11). 
For this research project, it may be useful to assess whether the current presence of EU 
institutions in social media is still mostly based on top-down communication processes, 
or if they have incorporated further citizen engagement. Although there is a lack of re-
cent research on the social media presence of European institutions, a few articles give 
an idea of the current situation. Marino and Lo Presti’s content analysis of the use of 
Twitter by European Commissioners shows that one-way communication strategies are 
still predominant in the platform (Marino and Lo Presti, 2018: 56). Krzyżanowski also 
analyses the communication strategy of the European Commission on Twitter, similarly 
concluding that the EU does not regard the potential of social media for connecting with 
citizens and only focuses on self-presentation (Krzyżanowski, 2018: 16). 
Focusing on Instagram, although various European institutions and members of the EU 
have accounts on the platform, to my knowledge there is currently no existing research 
which examines the political uses of the social network from an EU perspective. 
 
 
4. Methodology and data 
4.1. Instagram as a political communication platform 
 
In this thesis, images and videos published on the Instagram accounts of the European 
Parliament and the European Commission will be investigated using qualitative content 
analysis, in order to understand how these institutions present themselves and make use 
of the platform. The analysis focuses exclusively on Instagram because it is a popular 
visual-centered social media platform which allows analyzing the self-representation of 
political actors and, in this case, institutions, from a visual perspective. Existing litera-
ture about the role of visuality in political communication has tended to focus on how 
political actors have been framed by mass media. Nonetheless, visual content is also 
crucial for political communication in the context of social media, because it allows 
building one’s image and having a strong impact on viewers (Filmanov, Russmann and 
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Svensson. 2016: 2). As Glantz claims, “the praise that Instagram has received as a polit-
ical communication tool has tended to focus on how it provides politicians with a con-
cise, direct method of sharing their message and enhancing their image, and how it 
helps citizens feel personally connected to government and its leaders” (Glantz, 2013: 
695). 
There are previous analyses of the self-representation of European political institutions 
on text-based social media, however those focus on Facebook and especially Twitter 
(Vesnic-Alujevic, 2013; Gaušis, 2017; Karantzeni and Gouscos, 2013; Leston-Bandeira, 
2013; Marino and Lo Presti, 2018; Krzyżanowski, 2018). On the other hand, the few 
analyses conducted on Instagram tend to focus on individual political actors or political 
institutions in national contexts (Filminov, Russmann and Svensson, 2016; Lanclette 
and Raynauld, 2017; Liebhart and Bernhardt, 2017; Eldin, 2016; Muñoz and Towner, 
2017; Holiday, Lewis and LaBaugh, 2015).  
4.1.1. Instagram: visuality and interaction 
 
Instagram is a social media platform based on the publication of visual content (pictures 
and short videos) launched in 2010, and currently owned by Facebook. With more than 
one billion monthly active users and more than 500 million daily users, it is one of the 
most used social media platforms nowadays (Instagram Info Center, 2018). Instagram 
does not offer any official data about the demographic characteristics of users; nonethe-
less, the platform seems to be especially popular among young people. In the US con-
text, the report Teens, Social Media and Technology, published by the Pew Research 
Center, claims that a 72% of teens use Instagram, making it the second most popular 
social media platform among that age group in the US (Anderson and Jiang, 2018: 2). In 
the age group between 18 and 24, the percentage of Instagram users is similar, with a 
71% of active users. However, when looking at the average use of social media by 
adults in the US, Instagram still appears in third place, but only a 35% of adults claim to 
use it (Smith and Anderson, 2018: 2-4). Unfortunately, to my knowledge there is cur-
rently no available data about the demographic characteristics of Instagram users in Eu-
rope. However, the American context gives an idea of the popularity of the platform 
among young people. 
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The main purpose of Instagram is allowing users to edit and to share pictures and videos 
in their profiles, and to interact with the content of other users. The content published on 
the platform is visible to all users, unless the settings of the profile are changed to pri-
vate. Users on Instagram are divided between followers and followed, meaning that the 
content published by followed accounts will appear on the follower’s main page. More-
over, users can also browse through content that Instagram algorithm provides, and 
search for specific content according to an account name, hashtag or geolocation. There 
are two types of accounts on Instagram: personal accounts for individual users and 
business accounts for companies and organizations, which additionally offer statistical 
information about content views and followers. According to Instagram, in 2019 there 
are a total of 25 million business profiles on the platform (Instagram, 2019). 
In 2016, Instagram launched one of its most popular features, named Stories. The fea-
ture was created to work similarly to the social media platform Snapchat, in which users 
can post visual content that becomes available for other users to view during a period of 
24 hours. The content published on the Stories function disappears after 24 hours of its 
publication; however, users have the choice of featuring previous Stories in their pro-
files, which become visible indefinitely. In 2018, Instagram estimated that 400 million 
users were using the Stories function, which is twice the amount of active Snapchat us-
ers (Business Insider, 2018).  
With the Stories feature, users can post images and short videos which are viewable in a 
slideshow format. Content published in Stories is visible for everyone unless the pub-
lisher’s profile is private, and users can react to Stories by sending a private message, or 
by resharing them in their own profile if they are featured in the content. Moreover, the 
function offers multiple possibilities to edit the content before publishing it. For exam-
ple, it is possible to add filers, text, emoticons and GIFS, tag other users, or include the 
current geolocation and time; among other elements. It is also possible to add interac-
tive features such as polls, ratings and questions to a Story, which other users can an-
swer to. The results of polls and ratings become visible to those who have responded to 
them; in the case of questions, the answers can be shared if the asking user decides to do 
so. Finally, the Stories feature also allows users to make live video retransmissions. 
Besides the above mentioned interactive features in Stories (polls, questions, ratings and 
live retransmissions), Instagram offers other possibilities of interaction between users. 
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Users can react to regular posts by “liking” them or by writing comments on them, and 
they have the possibility to “like” and answer other people’s comments as well. Private 
messages can be used to engage into direct conversation or to respond to Stories. Public 
content can be shared by other users in their own profiles; however, in the case of Sto-
ries, it is only possible to do so if the sharing user is tagged in the content. Finally, in 
both Stories and regular posts it is possible to add hashtags, links to external pages, cur-
rent locations and to tag other users. Overall, the interactive possibilities of Instagram 
are similar to those on Twitter, but lower in comparison with other social media plat-
forms such as Facebook. For example, Instagram does not allow creating “groups” or 
“events” that users can subscribe to, nor engaging into chat conversations with multiple 
users at the same time. 
As it is the case with other major social media platforms, political actors and institutions 
make use of Instagram to spread their content and to communicate with citizens. More-
over, the platform itself is trying to promote political participation; for example, during 
the 2018 US midterm elections Instagram introduced two new features to encourage 
people to register and vote. On the one hand, the platform provided all the necessary 
information about how to register to vote using inserted advertisements2. On the other 
hand, Instagram launched an “I voted” sticker in order for users to share their voting 
experience in their Stories3. These two features are relevant because they are examples 
of how Instagram itself is trying to mobilize users into political participation. However, 
something to be noted about the political uses of Instagram is that, since users are more 
likely to see content only from accounts they agreed to follow or from similar accounts 
to the ones they interact with, the platform may be more useful in terms of connecting 
citizens with institutions and politicians who they already support, rather than changing 
their current political views (Glantz, 2013: 695). The following section will consist on 
an overview of the existing research about political communication on Instagram. 
                                                             
2Instagram (2018). Helping Our Community Register to Vote: https://instagram-
press.com/blog/2018/09/18/helping-our-community-register-to-vote/ 
 
3Instagram (2018). Sharing Your Election Day Excitement on Instagram: https://instagram-
press.com/blog/2018/11/01/sharing-your-election-day-excitement-on-instagram/ 
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4.1.2. Political communication research on Instagram 
 
Although nowadays Instagram is one of the most used social media platforms, and it has 
also been adopted by political institutions and actors to manage their image through the 
publication of visual content, it has remained comparatively unexplored in relation with 
other popular social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter. This might be ex-
plained due to the fact that Instagram does not facilitate the collection of data for re-
search purposes, and additionally because the platform is relatively new in comparison 
with the other mentioned social networks. The number of existing research about politi-
cal communication on Instagram is indeed rather limited. Still, in recent years more 
studies have emerged which analyze how politicians and institutions communicate on 
the platform. The research on the political uses of Instagram has especially focused on 
the self-presentation of individual actors in different national contexts.  
In 2016, in one of the first research projects about political communication on Insta-
gram, Filminov, Russmann and Svensson analyzed how Swedish political parties used 
the social media platform for campaign purposes during the 2014 elections in Sweden. 
They concluded that parties mainly used Instagram for broadcasting information rather 
than mobilizing citizens, and that personalization was strongly present in the content; 
for example, parties tended to use the image of top candidates in the pictures published 
on their Instagram profiles (Filminov, Russmann and Svensson, 2016: 8-9). In 2017, 
Lanclette and Raynauld explored the visual rhetoric of Canada’s Prime Minister Justin 
Trudeau on Instagram through the first year after he was elected (2017: 29). Similarly, 
Liebhart and Bernhardt analyzed the image management of Alexander Van der Bellen 
on the platform during the 2016 Presidential Election Campaign in Austria (2017: 12). 
In both cases, results point out that the Prime Ministers shaped their image by combin-
ing images in professional and personal contexts, and that they used Instagram mainly 
to broadcast, and in some occasions, mobilize their voters.  
Other articles that have explored the uses of Instagram for political communication in-
clude Eldin’s descriptive study analyzing the effects of Instagram during the election 
campaign of 2015 in Bahrain (Eldin, 2016); Muñoz and Towner’s analysis on the can-
didates’ Instagram profiles during the US Presidential Primary Elections campaign 
(Muñoz and Towner, 2017), and Holiday, Lewis and LaBaugh’s study that explores 
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how the president of Syria Bashar al Assad presented himself differently to English and 
Arab audiences in his Instagram account (Holiday, Lewis and LaBaugh, 2015). 
Although the mentioned research gives some insight on how Instagram is being used by 
politicians and, to some extent, political parties on a national level, there is no previous 
research focusing on how transnational political institutions present themselves on In-
stagram. Moreover, even though the Stories feature is widely used by political and insti-
tutional accounts, to my knowledge there are currently no existing studies which ana-
lyze the use of Stories in terms of political communication, and therefore it is a relevant 
aspect to take into consideration in this research project, due to the interactive possibili-
ties it includes. In conclusion, the existing research on political communication in the 
context of Instagram is very limited, and further analyses are necessary in order to have 
a better understanding of the political uses of this social media platform. As visuality is 
a central aspect of Instagram, in the following section the relevance of visual content for 
political communication will be discussed. 
4.2. Visual communication 
 
Images are an effective tool when it comes to creating an impact on viewers and in-
fluencing their opinion, and therefore they are useful in the context of political commu-
nication, for example when trying to portray trust and legitimacy to citizens. In the past 
decades, visuality has become an essential part of marketing and political campaigning, 
and its relevance has increased even more in the online media landscape. The effect of 
images may also be enhanced when accompanied by text which provides additional 
information, as well as sound and speech in the case of videos (Filmanov et al. 2016: 3). 
However, even though visual content is increasingly relevant in online communication, 
it has remained comparatively less explored than textual elements (Highfield and Leav-
er, 2016: 4). 
 4.2.1. Political functions of visual content 
 
According to Schill, visual content has ten functions in political communication. These 
include “serving as arguments, having an agenda setting function, dramatizing policy, 
aiding in emotional appeals, building the candidate’s image, creating identification, 
connecting to societal symbols, transporting the audience, and adding ambiguity” 
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(Schill, 2012: 122). The most relevant of those functions in the political context is the 
argumentative one, since images can be used to persuade viewers as they tap “into exist-
ing cultural and historical knowledge within the audience”, usually accompanied by 
linguistic or textual arguments. For example, if a politician is portrayed with their fami-
ly in an informal context, or with crowds of supporters behind them, these images are 
making an argument about his or her values and character, and viewers may draw cer-
tain conclusions from it (Schill, 2012: 122-124).  
Another relevant function is the agenda-setting function. Visual content can be used by 
political actors to grab the attention of mass media, especially in the context of social 
networks. Since mass media and social media are both becoming increasingly visual-
centered, politicians may post pictures and videos that have more chances to be covered 
by news sites. This purpose is also related to the dramatization function, which refers to 
the power of images to “add interest” to the values they portray, as well as to the emo-
tional appeal of visual symbols and to the identification this emotional appeal can create 
on the viewers (Schill, 2012: 124-129). 
Building a candidate’s image is also an important function, since most citizens learn 
about politicians and the institutions they represent mainly through visual content. In 
Schill’s words, “because visual symbols are critical in forming a politician’s image, 
candidates and their advisors consider how to use those pictures to communicate a de-
sired image” (Schill, 2012: 127-128). The rest of functions that Schill describes are the 
documentation function, according to which visual content may be utilized to prove 
certain claims; the use of societal symbols such as flags or historical locations to create 
a connection between political actors and the symbols; the figurative transportation of 
the audience “to a time in the past or an idyllic future” through the emotional appeal of 
images, and the function of adding ambiguity in controversial arguments, for instance 
when intending to attack someone but not wanting to do it verbally and explicitly 
(Schill, 2012: 129-132). 
Similarly, Domke, Perlmutter and Spratt identify various functions of visual content. 
They propose that images have the abilities of being easily remembered, becoming 
icons of certain events or issues, retrieving happenings and having emotional impact, as 
well as political power in the sense that visual content can “create, alter, or reinforce 
elite or popular beliefs about causes and/or issues of the day and further affect govern-
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ment policy” (Domke, Perlmutter and Spratt, 2002: 133-134). However, their findings 
suggest that images do not have power on their own, but rather relate to preexisting 
ideas, cognitions and feelings, and moreover often appear in conjunction with words 
(Domke et al. 2002: 147). 
Finally, Geise and Baden use the term multimodality to refer to the “communicative 
interaction” between different modalities, such as sound, image and text, in a certain 
context. Different modalities create meaning as a whole by complementing each other, 
while each of them has their own potential and limitations. For example, text captions 
are often added in pictures to provide information that may not be deduced just by ob-
serving the image in itself (Geise and Baden, 2014: 4). 
4.2.2. Visuality online 
 
In the context of Web 2.0 and e-marketing, the need for visual content has increased. 
Marland proposes the term “image bytes” to define “the constant need for visual content 
and a market for free digital photos and video”. Visual content has become a “direct 
marketing tool” for politicians and institutions, who can communicate directly to citi-
zens using online communication channels such as social media platforms, becoming 
less dependent on journalists as intermediates to spread their messages to the audiences 
(Marland, 2012: 215-217). 
Focusing on social media, visual images have increasingly gained relevance with the 
rise in popularity of platforms such as YouTube, Instagram and Snapchat. Simulta-
neously, already popular text-based platforms such as Facebook and Twitter have incor-
porated more visual content among their uses (Highfield and Leaver, 2016: 3). In 
Russmann’s and Svensson’s words, “the sharing of images is becoming an integral part 
of the social media experience today, and given that social media platforms are the 
prime locus for sociability—at least among young people in the West—this shift to-
wards visuals arguably transforms how we relate to each other and the world around us” 
(Russmann and Svensson, 2017: 1).  
The relevance of visual communication should be understood differently in the context 
of social media than in traditional media. Videos and images in social networks tend to 
be accompanied not only by written text, but also by links, hashtags and emoticons, 
among other elements. Most social media platforms also allow filtering, framing and 
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editing pictures before being published. Therefore, visual content does not merely pro-
vide additional information but also involves “highly strategic and reflexive communi-
cation”, in the sense that the publishing individual or institution can specifically craft 
which impressions they want their content to have on viewers (Russmann and Svensson, 
2017: 2).  
4.3. Research design 
First of all, the research questions of this thesis are the following: 
1. In which ways do European political institutions use Instagram to communicate 
with citizens and how do they portray themselves on the platform? 
2. What are the differences, in terms of content, between the use of the Stories 
function and the regular posts? 
3. How do the interactive features of Instagram affect the institutions’ democratic 
deliberation with users? 
In order to examine the above presented research questions, multimedia content analysis 
will be implemented as a method to analyze content posted on Instagram by the official 
accounts of European institutions. Content analysis is understood in Krippendorff’s 
terms, as “a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from texts (or 
other meaningful matter) to the contexts of their use” (Krippendorff, 2004: 18). In this 
case, images and videos are the main focus of analysis; however, since visual content 
published on social media tends to appear mixed with other types of content (e.g. text in 
pictures/videos, emoticons as visual elements in texts), visual content will be analyzed 
in relation with textual elements and also speech, in the case of videos. Content analysis 
has been selected because it is a flexible method that allows analyzing different types of 
data and can be applied to a variety of research purposes, and therefore it is easily ex-
portable to the context of social media in this study (White and Marsh 2006: 23). More-
over, in reference to the third research question, the concept of democratic deliberation 
is understood widely as “any engagement in political debate” between institutions and 
citizens which is politically meaningful, since a wide interpretation of the concept al-
lows taking into consideration as many relevant aspects as possible in the analysis 
(Storsul, 2014: 25). 
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The data will be examined using a qualitative approach. Qualitative content analysis can 
be defined as “a research method for the subjective interpretation of the content of text 
data through the systematic classification process of coding and identifying themes or 
patterns” (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005: 1278). In the context of this study, this type of 
design may be more appropriate in order to provide a detailed insight of the content 
published by the European institutions on Instagram, due to the lack of existing research 
on the topic.  
Additionally, thematic analysis will be also be used as a method. Thematic analysis is 
considered a subtype of qualitative content analysis, which allows “analyzing, organiz-
ing, describing, and reporting themes found within a data set” (Braun and Clarke, 2006; 
in Nowell et al. 2017: 2). Themes do not necessarily depend “on quantifiable meas-
ures”, but rather on their relevance in relation with the research questions. There are two 
different ways to identify themes in the analysis: in inductive analysis the themes arise 
from the data itself, while in deductive analysis themes are defined according to pre-
vious theory and research (Nowell et al. 2017: 8). In this research project, the themes of 
the content have been defined inductively. On the other hand, deductive analysis has 
been used in the rest of the content analysis. Particularly, the main categories of analysis 
have been defined according to a prior research project of political communication on 
Instagram conducted by Russmann and Svensson (2016), in order to avoid too much 
personal subjectivity in the coding process of the data.  
Something to be taken into consideration while using content analysis as a method in 
communication research is that “communications tend to reinforce the very institutional 
explanations and rules by which they are created and disseminated” (Krippendorff, 
2004: 73). For example, traditional mass media tends to operate accordingly with the 
one-way theory of communication; therefore communication research is more likely to 
encourage the use of this theory instead of providing insights on other types of commu-
nication (Krippendorff, 2004: 73-74). While social media are more interactive by nature 
than traditional media, since they are based on many-to-many communication, this does 
not imply that the interactive possibilities are fully exploited by those who communicate 
through them. 
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4.4. Data collection 
 
The units of sampling for this research project include the institutional accounts of the 
European Parliament (@europeanparliament) and the European Commission 
(@europeancommission) on Instagram. The sampling has been planned in a purposive 
way that allows identifying relevant and specific answers to the research questions 
(White and Marsh, 2006: 35). The first requisites were that the accounts should be offi-
cial and represent the view of the central EU institutions. Therefore, other institutional 
accounts which only post content directed towards citizens of certain European states, 
as well as official accounts of members of the mentioned institutions, have not been 
considered for analysis. Moreover, the activity level of the institutions on Instagram has 
also been taken into consideration, meaning that inactive accounts have not been in-
cluded in the analysis. The Council of the European Union (@eucouncil) was also part 
of the first sampling; however, after collecting the data, I decided not to include it in the 
sample due to the lack of content published during the analyzed period. 
Data has been collected exclusively on Instagram and includes both pictures and videos, 
as well as their captions. There are two different types of data: regular posts, which are 
available indefinitely in the user’s profile, and Stories, which is content available only 
during 24 hours. For the present study, other types of content available on the Instagram 
profiles of the institutions, such as live video transmissions through IGTV and previous 
Stories featured in their profiles, as well as user comments, have not been considered for 
analysis. Images were saved using regular screenshots, while videos were recorded and 
stored using a screen recording application (DU Recorder). 
The analyzed content was collected during a period of 30 days, between January 16th 
and February 15th 2019. A total of 372 units were collected, from which 111 are regular 
posts and 261 are Stories. Specifically focusing on the content of each institution, the 
European Parliament posted 47 posts and 192 Stories during the analyzed period, while 
the European Commission published 64 posts and 69 Stories. Data collection units are 
formed by individual posts and individual Stories respectively. However, due to the 
characteristics of Instagram, an individual post may include more than a single image or 
video; nonetheless in the case of Stories it is only possible to have one image or video 
per unit. In order to facilitate the analysis process, each unit has been given an individu-
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al number and a different letter to identify whether it is a regular post or a Story. Posts 
are identified with a “P” (P1, P2…), while Stories are identified with an “S” (S1, S2…). 
After the collection process, the data was transferred from a smartphone to a computer 
for further analysis. The content was categorized using the program Microsoft Office 
Excel. The units of analysis are the same than the units of data collection in the case of 
regular posts (1 unit = 1 post), but in the case of Stories individual units have also been 
gathered together thematically to analyze certain aspects. This is due to the fact that, in 
many occasions, individual Stories do not have full meaning on their own, but are part 
of a bigger unit of content instead. For example, a video of a speech by a politician may 
be split in two or three different Stories, due to the existing limitation of time for videos 
on Instagram; however, in this case, the speech only makes sense when taking into ac-
count all the videos as a whole. In total, 67 thematic units of analysis were identified in 
Stories. 
4.5. Data analysis 
 
In order to analyze the visual content published on Instagram by the European Parlia-
ment and the European Commission, the four clusters presented by Uta Russmann and 
Jakob Svensson in their article Studying Organizations on Instagram will be used 
(2016: 4). The clusters are the following: 
- Perception: what is the purpose of the content? Is it used for mobilizing the 
viewers or broadcasting information? Does it portray a certain image of the in-
stitution? (1st research question) 
- Image management: what kind of message is the content trying to portray? Is 
there personalization, privatization or celebratization? (1st research question) 
- Integration: does the content include links to other platforms? Does it make ref-
erence to other media? Are other users tagged? (1st and 2nd research questions) 
- Interactivity: does the content provide opportunities of engagement with users? 
(3rd research question) 
The categories introduced above represent an adequate frame for coding the data in the 
context of this study because they have been specifically created for analyzing content 
on Instagram. Moreover, they can be used in accordance with the research questions of 
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this research project. Although Russmann and Svensson originally applied the catego-
ries exclusively to regular posts and pictures, they are easily applicable to Stories and 
videos as well. The authors themselves state in their article that “our hope is that the 
readers of this Special Issue will use as well as adapt our methodological framework to 
advance research on Instagram or other image-based social media platforms” (Russ-
mann and Svensson, 2016: 2). Consequently, using those clusters of analysis does not 
represent a problem of interests. 
Although the main categories of analysis are extracted from the article of Russmann and 
Svensson, certain variables have been modified and new ones have been added accord-
ing to the research questions and the type of data of this study. For example, as the 
analysis focuses exclusively on the content published by European institutions on Insta-
gram, some aspects of integration (such as the sharing of the same content in other on-
line media sites) and interactivity (such as user comments and likes) have not been tak-
en into consideration. Furthermore, other variables which are necessary to answer the 
research questions have been added. In order to facilitate the analysis process and make 
it as impartial as possible, variables only include mutually exclusive categories, except 
in the case of topic and hashtags, in which the categories will be defined inductively 
from the content itself.  
In the table below, the four clusters defined by Russmann and Svensson will be pre-
sented along with the coding variables included in each of them: 
 
Perception Image manage-
ment 
Integration Interactivity 
Main purpose of content 
• Broadcasting/ 
informing 
• Mobilizing 
• Ambivalent 
Type of content 
• Picture 
• Illustration 
• Video 
• Animation 
Available links 
• Instagram (own 
account) 
• Instagram (dif-
ferent account) 
• Other social 
media (own ac-
count) 
• Other social 
media (different 
account) 
• EU institutional 
webpage 
• Others 
Interactive elements 
(only in Stories) 
• Questions 
• Polls 
• Ratings 
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Explicit reference to users 
• Users are re-
ferred to expli-
citly 
• Users are not re-
ferred to expli-
citly 
Topic of the content  Content similarity be-
tween Stories and posts 
• Same content 
• Same topic but 
different content 
• Different content 
and topic 
 
Citizen engagement 
in democratic delibe-
ration 
• Explicitly 
fosters deli-
beration 
• Does not 
foster  deli-
beration 
Context 
• Official 
• Extra-
official/informal 
• Not applicable 
Hashtags   
Perception 
• Snapshot 
• Staged 
• Not applicable 
Personalization 
• Personalized 
• Not persona-
lized 
  
 
 
 
 
The building of the Euro-
pean identity 
• Elements of Eu-
ropean identity 
are visible/ men-
tioned 
• No visible ele-
ments of Euro-
pean identity 
Celebratization 
• Celebrity visi-
ble 
• Celebrity not 
visible 
  
 Privatization 
• Private context 
• Public context 
  
 
In the following pages, the aspects that define the four clusters of analysis will be ex-
plained in more detail.  
4.5.1. Perception 
 
Perception, in the context of social media research, refers to the way people view, for 
example, a certain political institution through the visual content they post. Pictures and 
videos may have different purposes, such as spreading content (broadcasting), increas-
ing viewer participation (mobilization) and portraying a certain image of oneself (pers-
pective) (Russmann and Svensson, 2016: 4). Social networks serve as platforms for po-
litical institutions to portray themselves closer to regular citizens, by discussing aspects 
that directly affect them instead of presenting issues “on the abstract political level” 
(Vesnic-Alujevic, 2013: 27). 
The network logic offers a viable framework to understand how political communica-
tion unwinds on social media. As there is no such thing as mass communication in net-
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work media logics, it is not enough for politicians and institutions to be present on so-
cial media, but furthermore they must create a network of as many linkages as possible 
in order for their messages to reach as many users as possible. Moreover, the “virality” 
or popularity of the content is also a crucial aspect to expand the scope of audience in 
social media. For that reason, political actors may tend to publish content that is more 
likely to become viral, such as personalized and emotional messages (Klinger and 
Svensson, 2014: 1252-1253). 
In order to achieve a better understanding about how the European Parliament and the 
European Commission intend to be perceived by users on Instagram, the criteria of 
analysis will consist of the main purpose of the content, whether there is explicit refer-
ence to users, the context and perception of the image and, finally, if there is a clear 
intention to build a European identity.  
4.5.2. Image management 
 
Image management refers to the ways in which institutions portray themselves to create 
certain impressions on viewers. In many cases, social media is used to conceive a more 
trustful image about the organization; this can be achieved, for example, by focusing on 
certain individuals in the content (personalization), blurring between private and public 
spheres (privatization), and using celebrities to spread a certain message (celebritiza-
tion) (Russmann and Svensson, 2016: 4-5). The concept of “institutional personaliza-
tion”, for instance, refers to a situation in which certain individuals of an institution are 
enhanced due to their position as “leaders” (Balmas and Sheafer, 2013: 457). Although 
these trends are not new in political communication, there has certainly been an increase 
of their use during the last years (Balmas and Sheafer, 2013: 456).  
Personalization and celebritization in politics already existed before the Internet; for 
example, populist leaders have been using personalization techniques for a long time. 
However, these trends have been strengthened in the context of social media. Social 
fragmentation, accentuated by the social network potential of new technologies, has 
promoted the further individualization of citizens, by placing individuals at the center of 
their own networks. In that context, political institutions find that “personalized ap-
peals” help them engage better with “growing ranks of independent voters” (Bennett, 
2012: 22; Eckman and Widholm, 2014: 518). It is not enough for political actors to be 
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present in social media, but they should also achieve visibility by becoming active and 
targeting distinct audiences with different content (Vesnic-Alujevic, 2013: 19). 
In order to understand how European institutions are managing their social media image 
on Instagram, therefore, it will be relevant to identify whether their content tends to be 
personalized, and if trends of privatization and celebritization are also present. Moreo-
ver, other aspects of image management that will be analyzed include the topic of the 
content, the type of content and the use of hashtags.  
4.5.3. Integration 
 
The concept of integration or hybridity refers to the possibilities that social networks 
provide to integrate content on various platforms (Russmann and Svensson, 2016: 7).  
According to Klinger and Svensson, media hybridity can be defined as the overlapping 
between mass media and network media logics. For instance, political actors on Face-
book tend to share journalistic content about them posted on traditional media. At the 
same time, content published by certain actors on social media platforms, especially 
Twitter, may be shared in traditional media as well (Klinger and Svensson, 2014: 1251).  
Trump’s campaign in the 2016 US Presidential Elections represents a good example of 
media hybridity. According to Persily, Trump used Twitter to increase news coverage, 
in a similar way to issuing press releases. Twitter was not only a platform to communi-
cate with voters, but also a tool to provide content that would be shared on mass media 
sites, with the finality of increasing the impact of Trump’s messages (Persily, 2017: 67). 
The integration of content in the form of “media connectivity”, allows the image that 
politicians and institution are portraying of themselves to transcend the boundaries of 
social networks and online media, “creating a potentially infinite helix of self-mediation 
and news media attention” (Ekman and Widholm, 2014: 519). 
In this particular analysis, integration will be examined through the available links in 
the content posted by the European institutions. Moreover, the integration between Sto-
ries and regular posts will also be considered, by analyzing their similarities and differ-
ences. Instagram content shared on other platforms has not been taken into considera-
tion, as the analysis focuses exclusively on the content published by the European Par-
liament and the European Commission on their Instagram profiles. 
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4.5.4. Interactivity 
 
If institutions were to take full advantage of the opportunities that social media offers 
for democratic engagement, participation through online tools should go both ways. In 
other words, interaction between institutions and civil society is necessary in order to 
create a meaningful discussion and to communicate successfully through online plat-
forms (Vesnic-Alujevic, 2013: 13). According to Castells (2008) and Leston-Bandeira 
(2013), “multimodal” social networks are the most effective way for institutions to con-
solidate a communication channel that allows them to engage with the social demands 
of citizens.  
Interactivity is indeed a key feature of the democratic potential of social media, since it 
allows politicians and institutions to communicate directly with users, without the need 
of intermediaries. Furthermore, interactivity fosters the participation of civil society in 
public debates and in “decision-making processes”, allowing institutions to have a bet-
ter understanding of citizens’ demands (Russmann and Svensson, 2016: 8). On Insta-
gram, for instance, certain features are aimed at achieving further user participation 
through interactivity, such as the possibility to add questions, ratings and polls to a Sto-
ry.  
In this research project, therefore, interactive elements in Stories as well as their pur-
pose will be analyzed. Moreover, another aspect to consider while assessing the level of 
interaction between European institutions and civil society will be whether the content 
promotes the engagement of citizens in democratic deliberation with the institutions. 
Likes and comments will not be part of the analysis. 
4.6. Reliability and validity of the research 
 
Qualitative content analysis, the method that will be used to analyze the data in this re-
search project, is often portrayed as rather subjective (White and Marsh, 2006: 35). This 
is due to the fact that this method focuses on defining phenomena through a certain 
perspective and within a particular framework, instead of aiming to describe reality in 
an objective way (White and Marsh, 2006: 38). Subjectivity is moreover intensified in 
political communication research, since political communication tends to be “highly 
nuanced and are driven by marketing a specific crafted message” (Pal and Gonawela, 
2017:  99). In this context, defining the coding categories in advance does not guarantee 
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a straightforward classification of the content; content analysis always requires an “iter-
ative reading of the text” (White and Marsh, 2006: 33). 
Although subjectivity is inevitable, especially in qualitative research, in order to im-
prove the reliability and validity of this thesis I have exhaustively described the criteria 
and processes of data collection and analysis in the previous sections. Moreover, in this 
part I will express my own position regarding political communication in social media, 
with the intention to provide a relevant framework of the context in which this research 
project is set. 
My position is similar to the view of Persily (2017) and Tucker et al. (2017), according 
to which social media are neither democratic nor undemocratic by nature. These plat-
forms are indeed owned by profit-driven corporations; therefore I understand that their 
main purpose is not to promote democracy or democratic values, but rather to make 
economic profits. However, I also consider that the social network structure allows for 
more horizontal and direct ways of communication which, along with the popularity of 
these platforms, may be used for political institutions to encourage democratic delibera-
tion with citizens. In that sense, social media have the potential to become a public 
sphere and, therefore, one of the purposes of this thesis is to assess whether institutions 
are making use of that possibility. 
4.7. Ethical considerations 
 
Ethical considerations for the present research project have been taken into considera-
tion according to the Recommendations from the AoIR Ethics Working Committee 
(Markham and Buchanan, 2012). However, no major issues have aroused: the data col-
lected and analyzed can be used for research purposes because it is published by public 
institutions in an open social media platform. The topic of the research does not involve 
ethical problems either: as the purpose is merely to describe how European institutions 
make use of a certain social media platform, in this case there is no possible harm for 
the institutions and the people involved. 
The Data Policy of Instagram clearly states that public information includes content 
published and shared in a public Instagram profile, and that this type of content is ac-
cessible to anyone and can be “seen, accessed, reshared or downloaded” freely. Moreo-
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ver, the Data Policy explicitly expresses the possibility of the content being down-
loaded, screenshoted and reshared outside the platform with the following sentence: 
“people who can see your activity on our Products can choose to share it with others on 
and off our Products, including people and businesses outside the audience you shared 
with” (Instagram, 2018). Therefore, consent for data collection is not necessary, because 
the information is published publicly and it is presupposed that the analyzed institutions 
are aware of the Data Policy of Instagram. Furthermore, it is also understood that indi-
viduals who are featured in the analyzed content are aware of their appearance and have 
previously given their consent to it.  
 
 
5. Analysis 
In this section, the focus will shift to the results of the analysis of the content published 
by the European Parliament and the European Commission accounts on Instagram. The 
analysis is structured according to the clusters of analysis of Russmann and Svensson, 
presented in the methodology section. The results for each variable will be discussed in 
detail under the headings of each of the four clusters. 
5.1. Perception 
5.1.1. Main purpose 
 
The analysis of the data suggests that the majority of the content has a broadcasting 
purpose. Out of 376 collected units, 246 (66%) have a clear broadcasting function, 
while 80 (22%) have a mobilization purpose and 46 (12%) have an ambivalent purpose, 
in which both functions are equally present. Therefore, according to the results, Insta-
gram is mostly used by European institutions as a platform to inform users, rather than 
to mobilize citizens. Even though broadcasting is clearly predominant in both regular 
posts and Stories, the amount of informative content is higher in regular posts, while 
Stories tend to include slightly more mobilization. Specifically, 79 posts (71%) have a 
broadcasting purpose, while 18 (16%) have a mobilization purpose and 14 (13%) have 
an ambivalent purpose. On the other hand, 167 (64%) Stories have a broadcasting func-
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tion, while 62 (24%) have a mobili-
zation function and 32 (12%) have 
an ambivalent function.  
The European Parliament elections 
that will take place in May 2019 are 
a recurrent theme in the mobilizing 
content, most likely in order to in-
crease the participation rates. For 
example, through the analyzed pe-
riod, both the EC and the EP have 
been sharing content about their campaign This Time I’m Voting4, which intends not 
only to directly persuade citizens to vote in the EU elections, but also for people to en-
courage other citizens to vote through means of interpersonal communication. However, 
it should be noted that the category of mobilization does not exclusively include content 
which promotes political mobilization (e.g. persuading citizens to vote in the EU elec-
tions), but also other types of mobilization which may not be so relevant politically 
speaking (e.g. participating in photography contest organized by the European Parlia-
ment). 
Overall, the results of the analysis confirm that the European Parliament and the Euro-
pean Commission use Instagram mainly to broadcast information, and although mobili-
zation is also present to some extent, it does not always promote political participation. 
Previous studies about the social media presence of European institutions have also 
reached similar conclusions. Gaušis, Leston-Banderia and Karantzeni and Gouscos have 
all described the communication strategy of the European institutions as mostly based 
on one-directional types of communication with the purpose of informing citizens, ra-
ther than mobilizing them (Gaušis, 2017: 37; Leston-Bandeira, 2013: 9-10; Karantzeni 
and Gouscos, 2013:  491). Moreover, the results are also similar to the findings of Fil-
minov, Russmann and Svensson in their analysis of Instagram use by political parties 
during the 2014 Swedish elections, according to which broadcasting was the predomi-
nant function (2016: 8).  
                                                             
4 European Union (2018). This time I’m voting online campaign: https://www.thistimeimvoting.eu/  
66%
22%
12%
Broadcasting
Mobilization
Ambivalent
Figure 1. Main purpose (total) 
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5.1.2. Explicit reference to users 
Referring explicitly to users may serve as a way to promote citizen identification and 
engagement with social media content, especially if the content includes mobilization as 
one of its purposes. As Bellamy claims, the “sense of belonging to a community” is a 
key element of citizenship; however, it is a rather subjective aspect (2008: 6), and in the 
case of the EU there is the additional challenge of being an institution that represents 
very diverse national identities. Direct reference to users on Instagram can have many 
specific purposes, though in the context of EU institutions, referring explicitly to users 
in many occasions may also be considered as a way to make citizens feel more included 
in the European community. 
The results of this analysis indicate that explicit reference to users is fairly common in 
the communication strategies of both the EP and the EC. Specifically, 164 (44%) of the 
analyzed units include explicit reference to users, while 208 (56%) units do not refer 
explicitly to users. When focusing on regular posts, the percentages are more equally 
distributed: 58 (52%) of units include explicit 
reference to users, while 53 (48%) do not. On 
the contrary, in the case of Stories there is less 
explicit reference to users: 106 (41%) of the 
analyzed Stories refer directly to users, while 
155 (59%) do not.  
The fact that, on average, less than half of the 
analyzed units include direct reference to users 
is again a proof that much of the content pub-
lished by European institutions limits itself to 
present information to citizens, rather than en-
couraging mobilization. Although explicit refer-
ence to users is more common in mobilizing 
content, this feature is also identifiable in some 
informative content. For example, in a Story 
posted by the EP on the 1st of February 2019 
(S34), the institution refers directly to users by Figure 2. Example of explicit reference to users (unit S34 – European Parliament) 
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asking them a question, even though the purpose of doing so is merely to provide citi-
zens with information about the extent of use of the .eu domain online. 
In the analyzed content, reference to users most often appears as a textual element that 
accompanies the visual material, either in the caption or within the image. In some oc-
casions, it is also present in audiovisual content in the form of speech. According to 
Domke, Perlmutter and Spratt, words that accompany images, as well as preexisting 
values that the observer holds, are the elements that actually give “power” to images, 
since images do not have influence on their own (2002: 147). In that sense, referring 
directly to users may help accomplish purposes such as creating identification, trans-
porting the audience or achieving emotional reactions of users (Schill, 2012: 122). 
5.1.3. Context 
 
Mobile devices simplify the process of sharing content on social media, since they al-
low taking snapshots and uploading them online at any moment and in any location. 
Political organizations can take advantage of this possibility to share content in informal 
contexts which is not part of the official institutional agenda, since the costs of doing so 
are minimal (Russmann and Svensson, 2016: 4). Moreover, providing extra-official 
content may help institutions appear more transparent, approachable and honest to citi-
zens who engage with them on social media. 
Overall, in the analyzed data images and videos set in an informal or extra-official con-
text are more common than content set in an official context. In particular, in 133 (36%) 
units an informal context is identifiable, while 83 units (22%) unfold in an official con-
text. However, in most of the content, 156 units (42%), there is no visible context, 
mainly due to the fact that they are illustrations and animations. The percentages are 
also similar when focusing specifically on regular posts and Stories. In regular posts 
there are 43 units (39%) set in an informal context, 26 (23%) in an official context and 
42 (38%) in which the context is not identifiable. In Stories, 90 (34%) units are set in an 
informal context, 57 (22%) in an official context and in 114 (44%) the context is not 
identifiable.  
In general, therefore, informal contextualization is predominant in the images and vid-
eos published by the EP and the EC on Instagram, confirming that European institutions 
use the social media platform to introduce content aside from the official agenda of the 
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EU. For instance, in a set of videos published by the EP on the 17th of January 2019 in 
the Stories feature (S3), various presenters display the Parliament in a rather informal 
manner. Although the events in the content take place within the institution itself, the 
content is not part of any official event; moreover, the presenters speak in a rather in-
formal manner and occasionally use humor to communicate with users. Therefore, in 
this case, the context is considered to be extra-official. 
5.1.4. Perception 
 
Images uploaded on Instagram are usually snapshots recorded with smartphones which, 
as stated previously, facilitate the process of sharing visual content online. For that rea-
son, Russmann and Svensson wonder whether political organizations make use of the 
snapshot possibilities to appear more casual and “blend in” on Instagram, or whether 
contrarily they tend to present themselves in a more professional and staged manner 
(Russmann and Svensson, 2016: 4).  
The results regarding the perception of the content indicate that snapshots are slightly 
more predominant than staged content. In total, 111 units (30%) are snapshots, while 
106 (28%) are staged. In the rest of the 155 units (42%) perception cannot be analyzed, 
basically because the content consists of illustrations and animations. The amount of 
snapshots in regular posts is slightly higher than the average: 39 units (35%) are snap-
shots, while 25 (23%) are staged and 47 (42%) do not include any perception. In the 
case of Stories, 72 of the units (28%) consist of snapshots, while 81 (31%) are staged 
and in 108 units (41%) perception cannot be assessed.  
These results seem to be in accordance with the findings regarding the context of the 
images: although the differences are not as noticeable, snapshot images, which are 
usually taken in informal contexts, are slightly more predominant than staged images, 
which tend to be portrayed in official contexts. The analyzed institutions may use Insta-
gram in similar ways than regular citizens, for example by adding filers, hashtags and 
other features before publishing videos and images, as a way to enhance the identifica-
tion of citizens (Filminov, Russmann and Svensson, 2016: 7). Publishing more snap-
shots, therefore, may also be understood as a way to appear closer to citizens.  
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5.1.5. The building of the European identity  
 
According to Karantzeni and Gouscos, the concept of European identity, which was 
developed to portray a sense of unity and common responsibility within EU citizens, is 
based on civic values such as “common institutions, rules and rights”, rather than on 
cultural values (Karantzeni and Gouscos, 2013: 479). This is clear when looking at the 
analyzed content: most of the content is written in English rather than in national lan-
guages, it often addresses to European citizens as a whole, and portrays European val-
ues such as laws, trade agreements, cooperation between countries, the flag and the Eu-
ro, among others, in a positive manner. 
Indeed, elements that shape the European identity are strongly present in the content 
posted on Instagram by the EP and the EC. European values are present in 271 of the 
analyzed units (73%), while 101 (27%) do not clearly portray any values of European 
identity. European identity is more common in regular posts than in Stories. In 86 of the 
posts (77%) European values are promoted, while in 25 units (23%) they are not pro-
moted. In the case of Stories, 185 units (71%) promote European values and 76 (29%) 
do not. 
These percentages demonstrated that the promotion of European values is a central as-
pect in the content published by the analyzed institutions. The building of a European 
identity can be understood as a strategy to gain more legitimacy or, in Karantzeni’s and 
Gouscos words, as “a way to advertise 
the institutions” (Karantzeni and 
Gouscos, 2013:  491). This social me-
dia strategy should be framed within 
the current context of lack of legitima-
cy of EU institutions, intensified by a 
widespread skepticism about citizen 
involvement in European political af-
fairs, as well as by a lack of informa-
tion about European issues is main-
stream media (Karantzeni and Gous-
cos, 2013: 480-481). Creating a sense 
73%
27%
Yes
No
Figure 3. The building of the European identity (total) 
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of unity based on the values of European identity may persuade citizens to become more 
involved and interested in European affairs and, at the same time, help institutions gain 
more legitimacy and appear more transparent. 
The celebration of the 20th anniversary of the Euro is a clear example of how the ana-
lyzed institutions use an element representative of the EU to reinforce European identi-
ty. On the 21th of January 2019, the European Commission shared a video on their pro-
file for the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the Euro titled “The Euro makes it easier” 
(P20), pointing out how the currency has facilitated the processes of travelling, working 
and transferring money within the EU. The video clearly intends to portray the Euro in a 
positive manner, as an element that has helped bringing European citizens together. 
5.2. Image management 
5.2.1. Type of content 
 
Visuality is a central characteristic of Instagram, since the main purpose of the social 
media platform is editing and publishing pictures and videos, as well as interacting with 
other users’ published content. Images, followed by videos, are unsurprisingly the most 
predominant type of content in the Instagram profiles of the analyzed European institu-
tions, although they almost always appear accompanied by text (and sound in the case 
of audiovisual content). Taking into account the results concerning the purposes of the 
content, presented in the previous section, it is clear that the EP and the EC use visual 
content on Instagram mostly as an advertising tool that allows them to communicate 
directly with citizens, therefore being less dependent on intermediates such as mass me-
dia (Marland, 2012: 215, 217).  
Focusing on the type of content, pictures and images are slightly more predominant than 
videos. Approximately half of the content, 172 units (46%), are pictures. The second 
biggest category is videos, with 126 units (34%). The rest of categories include illustra-
tions, with 61 units (17%), and animations, with 12 units (3%). There are, however, 
some noticeable differences in the type of content between Stories and regular posts. 
Still pictures are overall more predominant in regular posts, while videos are more 
common in Stories. Specifically, in regular posts there are 63 pictures (57%), 18 illu-
strations (16%), 22 videos (20%), 7 video animations (6%) and one unit with both pic-
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tures and videos. On the other hand, in Stories there are 109 pictures (42%), 43 illustra-
tions (16%), 104 videos (40%) and 5 video animations (2%). 
5.2.2. Topic of the content 
The themes presented by the European institutions in their Instagram accounts are high-
ly diverse. Seven main topics have been identified in the content: elections, European 
values, information about EU and institutions, institutional events, legislation and citi-
zen rights, member states, and promotion of services and programs. Moreover, the cate-
gory “others” has been created to include content which does not fit in any of those top-
ics. Something to take into consideration is that although categories are exclusive in 
order to facilitate the analysis, most of the content includes aspects from more than one 
topic; only the most predominant topic is reflected. For example, European values are 
present in much of the content; however, they do not usually appear as the main topic of 
the content.  
Focusing on regular posts, legislation and citizen rights is the topic which appears the 
most in the content, specifically in 41 units (37%). This category is fairly wide and in-
cludes a great variety of subtopics; among the most prominent ones are biodiversity and 
environment (8 units), health (6 units), agriculture and animal welfare (6 units), as well 
as Internet use and data protection (6 units). The rest of the topics in regular posts are 
present to a rather equal extent. In particular, issues about member states are present in 
18 posts (16%), from which Brexit and visits of Heads of State in the EP are the most 
predominant subtopics. The category of European values includes 14 posts (13%), and 
the most recurring subtopic is the EP photography contest I am Europe, which intends 
to show the diversity of European citizens. Regarding the rest of topics, 11 units (10%) 
include information about the EU and about the institutions, 10 units (9%) are promot-
ing EU services or programs, such as the Erasmus+ program; 7 (6%) are about the EU 
elections, 7 about institutional events and 3 (3%) do not fit in any of the established 
categories.  
Focusing on Stories, topics are more evenly distributed among the 64 thematic units 
than in the case of regular posts, although some recurrent themes are also identifiable. 
Legislation and citizen rights appear in 15 units (23%), from which agriculture and an-
imal welfare (3 units), Internet use and data protection (3 units) and self-driving cars (3 
units) are the most predominant subtopics. European values are present in 12 units 
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(19%), again consisting mostly on the photography contest organized by the EP (9 
units).  11 units (17%) present information about the EU and the institutions; the most 
prominent subcategory is the EU Alphabet section created by the EP, in which concepts 
related with the EU are explained. Issues about member states appear in 10 units (16%), 
again mostly about Heads of State visits to the EP (4 units) and Brexit (3 units). Finally, 
the topic of institutional events includes 7 units (11%), EU elections 5 units (8%) and 
promotion of EU services and programs 4 units (6%). 
5.2.3. Hashtags 
 
Hashtags are widely used by European institutions in their Instagram communication 
strategy to accompany visual content, being much more predominant in regular posts 
than in Stories. Approximately half of the units (187) include hashtags, while 185 (50%) 
do not. When looking specifically at regular posts, 85 units (77%) include hashtags, 
while 26 (23%) do not. On the other hand, hashtags are much less used in Stories: 102 
units (39%) include hashtags, while 159 (61%) do not. 
Hashtags have been taken into account as an aspect of analysis because they offer an 
idea of which themes are relevant to the institutions. In many occasions, hashtags make 
reference to key concepts in relation with the main topic of the visual content. For ex-
ample, hashtags such as #Brexit, #EUFilmContest, #PlasticsStrategy and #WomeninS-
cience clearly present specific topics of the content. However, in other cases, hashtags 
are also inserted to enhance user identification with the institutions. Some of the most 
used hashtags by the EP and the EC on Instagram include #IamEurope, #EUandME and 
#FutureOfEurope. These hashtags do not directly refer to the topic of the content they 
accompany, but rather reinforce the existence of a European identity and position the 
content within it. By introducing these hashtags in different pictures and videos institu-
tions promote their use, as users that identify with European values may also embed 
them in their own content.  
5.2.4. Personalization 
 
Personalization, together with other trends such as celebratization and privatization, is 
part of the process of individualization of political communication on social media 
(Loader, Vromen and Xenos, 2016: 405). Depending on the perspective, personalization 
can be viewed either as beneficial or detrimental for democratic engagement with ci-
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tizens. On the positive side, new trends of 
political communication such as 
zation may be considered as useful tools for 
engaging young people in politics and dem-
ocratic participation. In Loader, Vromen 
and Xenos’ words, these alternative pers-
pectives “allow us to consider that the cul-
ture of democratic politics may be changing 
without denying the possibility of its exis-
tence” (Loader et al., 2016: 404). On the 
negative side, institutions which use those 
trends mainly focus on branding their im-
age, holding a neoliberal point of view that 
dominates the use of social media platforms 
for political purposes, and undermining the 
“political education of young people” 
(Eckman and Widholm, 2014: 518-519; 
Loader et al., 2016: 403).  
 
The analyzed content posted by European institutions on Instagram tends to be rather 
personalized, meaning that individual people are often portrayed in it. For example, in 
the unit P26, the EP presents the European Youth Event though portraying one of the 
participants. In particular, 218 units (59%) include personalization to some degree, 
while 154 units (41%) do not appear to be personalized. Personalization is more com-
mon in Stories than in regular posts, since Stories also tend to focus on less abstract 
issues. Particularly, in regular posts 57 units (51%) include personalization and 45 
(49%) do not. When looking at Stories, 161 units (62%) are personalized, while 100 
(38%) are not.  
These results are also similar to findings of previous research about political communi-
cation on Instagram. In their analysis about Instagram communication of Swedish polit-
ical parties during the 2014 elections, Filminov, Russmann and Svensson found out that 
personalization was strongly present in the content (2016: 8-9). The predominance of 
Figure 4. Example of personalization (unit P26 
– European Parliament).  
54 
 
 
 
personalization in the analyzed content posted by the EC and the EP may be related 
with the function of enhancing citizen identification with the institutions. Due to the 
visual characteristics of social networks, and especially Instagram, users tend to engage 
more with content that portrays people rather than present institutions in an abstract 
manner. However, personalization should not be understood as a trend unique to social 
media, but rather as a characteristic of political communication which is present in visu-
al media (e.g. television), due to the fact that people are more easily remembered and 
accessible to citizens than “abstract arguments about policies” (Gurevitch, Coleman and 
Blumler, 2009: 166-167).  
5.2.5. Celebritization 
 
Celebritization is a trend related with the personalization of political communication, 
which consists of featuring celebrities in the content in order to achieve more influence 
and engagement with users. The term “celebrity connectivity”, presented by Mattias 
Ekman and Andreas Widholm, characte-
rizes the celebritization of politics in so-
cial media. In particular, celebrity con-
nectivity defines how political actors inte-
ract with other prominent figures, both in 
real life and online, in order to gain more 
attention from the public and from main-
stream media (Eckman and Widholm, 
2014: 518-519; Loader et al., 2016: 404). 
Although celebritization already existed 
before the Internet the online space, and 
especially social media, has helped ex-
pand aspects of popular culture in politi-
cal communication, such as celebrity be-
havior or reality TV conflicts, while si-
multaneously departing from formal poli-
tics and professionalized political com-
munication (Gurevitch et al. 2009: 171-
172). For the current analysis, only if cele-
Figure 5. Example of celebritization (unit P4 – 
European Commission) 
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brities who are not currently part of the institutions appear in the images it has been 
considered that there is celebritization.  
In accordance with the analyzed content, celebritization does not seem to have an im-
portant role in the communication strategy of European institutions, in contrast with 
personalization. More specifically, the analysis shows that 278 (85%) of the units do not 
feature celebrities, and only 48 (15%) do include celebritization. The same percentages 
apply when looking at regular posts: 94 posts (85%) involve celebritization, while 17 
(15%) do not. Regarding Stories, there is even less celebritization: only 31 units (12%) 
include celebrities, while 230 (88%) do not. Furthermore, most celebrities who appear 
in the content are Heads of Member States due to their visits in the European Parlia-
ment, such as in the above presented picture (P4) shared by the EC the 16th of January, 
rather than public figures featured solely with the purpose of promoting the institutions.  
The use of celebrities in social media content may be more related with individual poli-
ticians and political parties than with public political institutions, due to the fact that 
those political actors need to be in a constant campaign mode (Gurevitch et al. 2009: 
173-174). While public institutions also need to uphold their legitimacy, they may do so 
by using different techniques which are not so marketing-driven. For example, the ana-
lyzed European institutions on Instagram seem to portray closeness with citizens and 
encourage users to interact with them with the intention of appearing reliable and trans-
parent. 
5.2.6. Privatization  
 
Social media have blurred the boundaries between public and private spheres in many 
different levels, becoming part of the process of liquefaction of society; for instance, 
different social roles are usually integrated in a single platform (Fuchs, 2014: 77). The 
concept of “public connectivity” refers to the fact that that content publish by political 
actors on social media tends to erase existing boundaries between their public and pri-
vate life, as well as between politicians and their audience (Eckman and Widholm, 
2014: 518-519). In that context, privatization can be understood as the trend according 
to which aspects of the private life of public figures are shown on social media.  
Privatization is practically inexistent in the Instagram content of the analyzed political 
institutions. Although in many occasions, content is set in an informal context and per-
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sonalization is quite present, the focus is not on people’s private life, but rather on their 
relation with the institutions. In total, only three of the analyzed units include privatiza-
tion to some extent. One of them is a Story and two are regular posts. All three of these 
units consist of short videos: two of the units, posted by the EP, portray the personal 
relationship between two European citizens on the occasion of Valentine’s Day, making 
emphasis on the simplification that the EU has provided to travel within its boundaries. 
The third unit, published by the EC, consists of a trailer for a short film about a young 
man who turned dancing into his profession; in that case, the emphasis is on the produc-
tion of European audiovisual content. As in the case of celebritization, privatization may 
be more useful for individual political actors than for institutions. 
5.3. Integration 
5.3.1. Available links 
 
Links seem to be a relatively important element in the communication strategy of the 
EP and the EC on Instagram: although less than half of the analyzed units include linked 
pages, the amount is still quite significant. In total, 142 units (38%) include links to oth-
er sites, while 230 (62%) do not. The percentages of links are exactly the same when 
focusing on regular posts and Stories. 42 of the posts include linked pages and 69 do 
not, while 100 Stories include links and 161 do not (38% and 62% respectively). 
 
Figure 6. Available links (total) 
In order to have a better understating of the purposes of links, the types of sites linked 
have also been analyzed. In general, EU institutional pages and the institutions’ own 
Instagram accounts are the most linked sites. Links to EU pages appear in 66 units, 
69
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while links to their own Instagram accounts appear in 69 units. However, those links are 
unevenly distributed between regular posts and Stories: all links to Instagram and 26 of 
the links to EU institutional pages appear in Stories, while in regular posts links to EU 
sites are predominant, with 40 units. Other types of links do not seem to have such an 
important role in the analyzed units. Content published on other social media platforms, 
namely Facebook, has been linked in four occasions on Stories, one of them being an 
account external to the EU, and the rest of them being accounts of the analyzed institu-
tions. Finally, there are three links which do not fit within the proposed categories (two 
in regular posts and one in Stories). Out of these three links, two are links for download-
ing an application and one is a UN page. 
The possibilities of including links to external sites on Instagram allow European insti-
tutions to integrate different platforms and web pages in their communication strategy 
(Russmann and Svensson, 2016: 7). Although other social media platforms do not seem 
to be especially integrated on the Instagram content of the EP and the EC, EU institu-
tional webpages, on the other hand, often appear in the content to provide additional 
information. In the case of Stories, links seem to be used mostly to promote regular 
posts published by the institutions themselves on Instagram. 
5.3.2. Similarity between posts and Stories 
 
There are two main types of visual content on Instagram: regular posts and Stories. The 
characteristics of each of them have been further explored in the methodology chapter 
of this thesis. Overall, Stories offer more possibilities in terms of interactivity with us-
ers, although their impact may be reduced by the ephemerality of the feature, since con-
tent disappears after 24 hours of its publication. On the other hand, regular posts offer 
more possibilities to edit and add textual information to images and videos, but less in-
teractive features.  
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Figure 7. Similarity between posts and Stories (total) 
Similarities and differences between the content have been analyzed from the perspec-
tives of posts and Stories respectively. Content published as regular posts tends to be 
more distinct in relation with content posted on the Stories feature. In particular, 57 
posts (51%) are totally different in terms of content and topic from Stories, while 28 
units (25%) consist of very similar content and 26 (24%) include the same topic but 
different content. On the other hand, content published in Stories tends to be more simi-
lar to content in regular posts. Only 58 Stories (22%) are completely different from 
posts, while 120 units (46%) have a similar topic but different content and 83 (32%) 
have exactly the same or very similar content.  
These percentages indicate that Stories may be used by European institutions mostly as 
a way to promote or complement content published on regular posts, since the analyzed 
units that appear in Stories tend to reflect content posted in the profiles of the EP and 
the EC, rather than the other way around. Moreover, the findings go hand in hand with 
the results about the use of links in the Stories function, according to which Stories tend 
to include links to regular posts in the profile of the institutions. Regular posts do not 
reflect content in Stories to the same extent, and actually include more different topics, 
therefore indicating less dependency from the Stories function. 
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5.4. Interactivity 
5.4.1. Interactive elements  
 
In his article about how the European Parliament portrays itself on social media in the 
Latvian context, Gaušis emphasizes that social media serve as platforms where EU in-
stitutions can reach European citizens independently of their geographical location and 
directly, without the need of using traditional media as an intermediary. Gaušis consid-
ers that interactive features of social media, for example the possibility to “like” and 
comment pictures or to create and answer surveys, among other aspects, are crucial to 
make direct communication between political actors and citizens possible. Those are 
relevant features that European institutions can use to communicate efficiently with 
citizens, and more specifically with young people, since this is the most active popula-
tion group on social media (Gaušis, 2017: 30). 
However, in the context of Instagram, it seems that interactive possibilities available in 
the Stories feature are not a central part of the communication strategy of European in-
stitutions. Only 36 units (14%) include interactive elements, while the vast majority, 
225 units (86%), does not. That lack of interactive possibilities appears to be in accor-
dance with previous research about European institutions on social media, which identi-
fy top-down and one-to-many communication strategies as predominant (Gaušis, 2017: 
37; Leston-Bandeira, 2013: 9-10; Marino and Lo Presti, 2018: 56; Krzyżanowski, 2018: 
16). Furthermore, the lack of interactivity also goes hand in hand with the findings of 
this analysis about the main purpose of the content, which have pointed out the fact that 
broadcasting is more common than mobilization. Although citizen interaction has not 
been regarded in this thesis, since the focus of the analysis is exclusively on the content 
published by EU institutions, it would also be an interesting aspect to assess in future. 
The interactive possibilities that Instagram offers include ratings, questions and polls. 
All of them appear in Stories published by both the EP and the EC: ratings have been 
added in 15 occasions, while polls appear 11 times and questions have been inserted in 
10 units. Moreover, European institutions seem to use interactive elements for different 
purposes. The most common one is allowing users to express their opinion about a cer-
tain subject (22 units). Interactive elements are also used to test users’ knowledge in six 
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occasions and to ask information about citizens in one occasion. Only in six units there 
is actual democratic deliberation with citizens. 
5.4.2. Engagement in democratic deliberation with citizens 
 
As stated in the above section, the level of democratic engagement with citizens of the 
EP and the EC is very low in the analyzed content. In the case of regular posts, there is 
no unit in which institutions explicitly promote democratic deliberation with citizens. 
Although political deliberation may appear on the comments, comments are not part of 
the scope of this study. In the Stories feature, 
there are eight units (3%) in which European 
institutions offer the possibility to engage in 
democratic deliberation. They do so by allow-
ing users to ask questions about certain issues 
directly to members of the Parliament and the 
Commission, who later answer them through 
live retransmissions on Instagram. For exam-
ple, in the unit S12, published by the European 
Parliament, the institution announces the live 
retransmission of an interview with 
Greens/EFA co-chairs the following day, and 
includes the question feature with the purpose 
of encouraging users to ask questions to the 
representatives. However, it should be noted 
that the great majority of analyzed Stories 
(97%) do not include any type of democratic 
deliberation.   
These results go hand in hand with findings of previous research about political institu-
tions on social media. The analyses conducted by Karantzeni and Gouscos, Marino and 
Lo Presti and Krzyżanowski on EU institutional accounts on other social media plat-
forms, mainly Twitter, all point out at the predominance of a one-directional and “for-
malistic” communication approach. According to the results of these studies, the social 
media strategy of the EU revolves around self-presentation and advertising, instead of 
providing citizens with opportunities to become more involved in political processes of 
Figure 8. Example of engagement in demo-
cratic deliberation with citizens (unit S12 – 
European Parliament) 
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the institutions (Karantzeni and Gouscos, 2013; Marino and Lo Presti, 2018; 
Krzyżanowski, 2018). Similarly, the results of this analysis also suggest that the EP and 
the EC use Instagram mainly as a platform to promote the institutions, rather than pro-
viding citizens with possibilities to become more involved in the processes of the EU. 
 
 
6. Discussion and concluding remarks 
6.1. Key findings 
 
This thesis has shed some light on the use of Instagram by European institutions for 
political communication purposes. In this section, the results of the analysis will be dis-
cussed in relation with the research questions, in order to present the most relevant find-
ings.  
1. In which ways do European political institutions use Instagram to communicate 
with citizens and how do they portray themselves on the platform? 
In general, the results of the analysis indicate that the European Parliament and the Eu-
ropean Commission use Instagram in a rather one-directional way, in accordance with 
previous research about European institutions on social media. Most of the content has 
an informative or broadcasting function. In content that has a mobilization purpose, the 
upcoming EU elections are a recurring theme: the institutions do not only intend to per-
suade citizens to vote, but also for them to encourage other people to vote. This use of 
mobilizing content may be related with the low participation in European elections, es-
pecially in the last years: during the 2009 and 2014 elections, the voter turnout was be-
low 43%, the lowest percentage in the history of the EU (European Parliament, 2014). 
The building of a European identity is also a central element of the communication 
strategy of the EC and the EP on Instagram. In the analyzed content, the institutions 
constantly portray aspects of European identity (such as the Euro or the flag) in a posi-
tive manner and make reference to European values. As Karantzeni and Gouscos stated, 
European citizenship is not based on cultural unity but rather on civic values (2013: 
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479-480). Therefore, creating a sense of European identity and unity on social media 
may help institutions appear closer to citizens and portray a more positive image of 
themselves. In some occasions, content is accompanied with explicit reference to users, 
which may also be considered as a way to make citizens feel more included in the Euro-
pean community.  
Personalization appears frequently in the analyzed images and videos; however, institu-
tions do not make much use of other related trends in political communication, such as 
celebritization and privatization. This may be due to the fact that these trends are usual-
ly part of the communication strategies of individual political actors and political parties 
who have to be in a constant campaign mode, rather than democratic institutions. On the 
other hand, personalization allows citizens to feel more identified with the people por-
trayed in the images. The EU is often criticized for its lack of transparency and for be-
ing undemocratic (Bellamy, 2008: 29-30), therefore featuring “common citizens” and 
giving voice to them may help institutions appear more transparent and closer to people.  
Moreover, the technical features of social media and mobile devices facilitate sharing 
content in any moment and in any location (Russmann and Svensson, 2016: 4). Euro-
pean institutions take advantage of these possibilities to share content aside from their 
official agenda, and occasionally publish snapshots which make their image seem more 
casual, rather than staged and professional. Providing extra-official and informal content 
may also enhance the image of approachability and transparency that European institu-
tions seem to be willing to portray on Instagram. However, it should be noted that a 
relevant portion of the content includes illustrations and animations, from which the 
perception and context cannot be analyzed. 
On Instagram, and social media in general, institutions have more control over their 
image: they can decide which content they want to publish in order to reflect the values 
they wish to portray. Most of the political functions that Schill defines regarding visual 
content (2012: 122) are clearly present, at least to some extent, in the Instagram com-
munication of European institutions. Some of the images and videos serve as arguments 
about their values; for example, the content both institutions posted about the Holocaust 
Remembrance Day clearly enhances the values of tolerance and unity against anti-
Semitism. Visual symbols may also have an agenda setting function; for instance, in 
some occasions, the EP published content about self-driving cars with a clear intention 
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of promoting their use. Finally, pictures and videos may also be used to create identifi-
cation, as in the case of the photography contest I am Europe organized by the EP, in 
which users are asked to portray common European citizens. These are only a few ex-
amples about different functions found in the analyzed units, but they give an idea about 
which types of visual content the institutions publish on Instagram. Indeed, political 
purposes are clearly identifiable in most of the content. 
2. What are the differences, in terms of content, between the use of the Stories func-
tion and the regular posts? 
Overall, similar topics are identifiable when comparing regular posts with Stories pub-
lished by the Parliament and the Commission on their Instagram accounts. According to 
the results, it is more common for posts to include content about topics which do not 
appear in Stories, than the other way around. Therefore, Stories tend to reflect the con-
tent in posts, implying that institutions may use this feature to promote or complement 
information presented in regular posts. On the other hand, regular posts include more 
diverse topics, which indicates less dependency from the Stories function. This situation 
may be explained due to the fact that messages on Stories are ephemeral and disappear 
after 24 hours of their publication, so the content may have less impact on users and, for 
that reason, the analyzed institutions do not want to present too many different topics on 
the feature. 
Specifically looking at the topics of the content that the EP and the EC share on their 
Instagram profiles, legislation and citizen rights is the most recurrent theme in both reg-
ular posts and Stories. However, this topic is clearly much more predominant in regular 
posts, while topics are more evenly distributed in the Stories function. Issues about 
member states and European values are also quite common in regular posts; both of 
these categories relatively relevant in Stories as well, together with informative content 
about the EU and the institutions. 
Regarding the purpose of the content, the main findings of the analysis indicate that 
Stories tend to include slightly more mobilization than regular posts; however in Stories 
there is also slightly less explicit reference to users and less promotion of European val-
ues. When focusing on how European institutions manage their image, there are also 
some noticeable differences in both features. Videos are more predominant in Stories, 
while still images and pictures are more frequently used in regular posts. Hashtags are 
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also more common in regular posts than in Stories, since they allow tracking posts but 
not Stories. On the other hand, content tends to be more personalized in Stories. Links 
are used equally in both Stories and regular posts, and seem to be a relatively important 
element in the communication strategy of the EP and the EC on Instagram. However, 
Stories tend to include more links to the Instagram profiles of the analyzed institutions, 
while the links in regular posts mostly redirect to EU institutional pages. These findings 
support the argument that European institutions use the Stories function mainly to com-
plement regular posts. 
Finally, a key aspect that differentiates the Stories feature from regular posts is the fact 
that Stories include more interactivity with users, with possibilities to add questions, 
ratings and polls to the content. However, although the EP and the EC make occasional 
use of those features, the data suggests that interactive features are not a regular part of 
their Instagram communication. As previous research has suggested (Gaušis, 2017; Les-
ton-Bandeira, 2013; Marino and Lo Presti; 2018, Krzyżanowski; 2018), the social me-
dia communication strategy of European institutions is still rather based on top-down 
communication processes, disregarding opportunities to interact directly with citizens. 
3. How do the interactive features of Instagram affect the institutions’ democratic 
deliberation with users? 
The results indicate that democratic deliberation of the EP and the EC with citizens is 
minimal on Instagram. Instead, the social media platform serves rather as an advertising 
platform for European institutions; although interactivity occasionally appears in the 
content, interactive features are not commonly used, and even less frequently with deli-
berative purposes. The few examples of democratic deliberation with users are Stories 
in which the EP and the EC allow citizens to ask questions directly to members of the 
institutions, that are later answered through live retransmissions on Instagram. Howev-
er, none of these interviews are presented in regular posts. 
These results are not surprising, since previous analyses about the communication strat-
egies of European institutions on social media platforms reached similar conclusions, 
suggesting that the EP and the EC use Instagram mainly as a platform to promote the 
institutions, rather than to provide citizens with possibilities to become more involved in 
the political processes of the EU. In a report published by the EC, the institution stated 
that the hierarchal structure of public institutions often clashes with the network struc-
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ture of social media platforms (European Commission, 2013: 11), which may be one of 
the challenges of European institutions to adapt to the platforms. 
In conclusion, European institutions do not exploit the interactive possibilities of Insta-
gram to establish more democratic deliberation with citizens. Nonetheless, it should be 
noted that social media platforms, including Instagram, are owned by large corporations 
with economic interests that do not necessarily promote democratic values. Therefore, 
in order to be noticed, institutions have to adapt their discourse to the characteristics of 
those platforms, which in turn decide the technological infrastructure, economic model 
and ideological orientation of the online ecosystem, and decide the ways in which plat-
forms, institutions and users interact with each other (Van Dijck, Poell, and de Waal, 
2018: 32).  
6.2. Significance and contributions of the research 
 
This thesis has contributed to the understanding of social media use by democratic insti-
tutions of the EU, especially regarding their visual self-presentation and interaction with 
citizens. The main findings of the analysis suggest that, rather than using the platform as 
a way to engage into democratic deliberation with citizens, European institutions use 
Instagram to advertise their policies and promote European values. Moreover, these 
results are similar to the findings of previous research that has analyzed how European 
institutions use social media (Gaušis, 2017; Leston-Bandeira, 2013; Marino and Lo 
Presti, 2018; Krzyżanowski, 2018), therefore indicating that democratic deliberation 
with citizens is nowadays not a central part of the communication strategy of the EU. 
In 2006, Habermas stated that the fact that mass media focuses on economic profits, 
promoting content based on entertainment and marketing logic instead of democratic 
values, is one of the main issues that prevents the existence of a public sphere (2006: 
421-422). Although this statement refers to traditional mass media, it is clearly applica-
ble to the context of social media. The findings of the analysis suggest that the Euro-
pean Parliament and the European Commission publish visual content on Instagram to 
present the institutions in a positive manner and promote European values, rather than 
to encourage relevant political discussion with citizens. They do so, for example, by 
encouraging user identification through personalization and explicit reference to users.  
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Social media platforms are owned by just a few US based corporations that dominate 
the online space (such as Facebook in the case of Instagram), which promote economic 
and corporate values above democratic ones. In this context, the popularity of social 
networks forces political and governmental actors to adapt their online discourse and 
build their image according to the characteristics of the existing platforms (Van Dijck et 
al. 2018: 15). This is especially relevant in the European context, since the public values 
promoted by EU institutions often come in conflict with the corporate values of social 
networks (Van Dijck et al. 2018: 139). Moreover, although in the past democratic insti-
tutions had their own ethical criteria, professional routines and formal procedures to 
shape their communication strategy, social media platforms challenge those procedures 
by means of commodification and selection techniques (Van Dijck et al. 2018: 47). In 
order to be noticed on Instagram and in order to improve their legitimacy, European 
institutions have had to readjust the way they present their values, prioritizing adver-
tisement techniques over democratic deliberation with citizens. 
In the case of this analysis, therefore, Instagram represents a public space in the sense 
that it facilitates direct interaction between institutions and civil society; however, it 
cannot constitute a public sphere, because even if the analyzed institutions make use of 
the interactive possibilities of the social network to communicate with citizens, most 
interactions do not allow engagement in democratic deliberation (Papacharissi, 2002: 
11). The limitations of social media regarding the possibilities it entails for becoming a 
public sphere should be considered, since interactions and communication on social 
media platforms are still very much shaped by the economic interests of the corpora-
tions that own them (Dahlgren, 2005: 151-152).  
Tedesco (2004: 510) claimed that online platforms are an appealing communication 
channel for political actors because they can present themselves directly in a much 
cheaper and unlimited space than advertisements. However, by applying the broadcast-
ing model based on economic profits to social media, political actors and institutions 
merely contribute to the increasing “public cynicism”, instead of achieving further polit-
ical engagement of citizens (Tedesco, 2004: 516). Moreover, the characteristics of so-
cial media platforms, specifically anonymity and the fragmentation of the public, foster 
a lack of accountability and the creation of “filter bubbles” making it easier to manipu-
late the public opinion, for example, through spreading fake news. Together with the 
lack of transparency of the companies that own social media platforms regarding their 
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data and governance model, this situation is increasing citizen demobilization and un-
dermining democratic values and democratic deliberation (Mazzoleni and Schulz, 1999: 
248; Van Dijck et al. 2018: 143-145).  
However, although Instagram, and social media in general, nowadays do not constitute 
a public sphere due to the limitations of the corporate powers that control them, they 
have the potential to become one (Fuchs, 2014: 89). One of the central aspects of social 
media platforms is interactivity, which makes possible direct communication between 
political institutions and citizens and erases the “hierarchal distances” that exist between 
them. Social networks also facilitate the circulation of information and political delibe-
ration, similarly to mass media. However, unlike television and press, in which oppor-
tunities for political participation are rather limited, social media platforms also offer 
more possibilities to participate in political processes (Storsul, 2014: 19). Moreover, 
they also allow bringing political discussion out of the national context, something es-
pecially relevant in the case of European institutions (Castells, 2008: 81). Focusing on 
Instagram, the analyzed content has proven that the platform can be used by European 
institutions as a tool to promote democratic deliberation with citizens: in a few occa-
sions, the institutions used interactive features to allow citizens to ask questions about 
relevant topics directly to members of the institutions. Since European institutions are 
increasingly reliant on social networks, therefore, they should put democratic values as 
a central aspect of their communication strategy and consider how those platforms can 
be used to further enhance democracy (Van Dijck et al. 2018: 146). 
6.3. Limitations of the study 
 
Even though this thesis offers valuable insights in the use of Instagram by European 
institutions, it also has various limitations which should be addressed. One of the main 
limitations is the fact that qualitative research is much affected by subjectivity (Hsieh 
and Shannon, 2005: 1278). Although the processes of data collection and data analysis 
have been explained in detail, and the categories for analysis have been defined as ex-
clusively as possible, subjectivity cannot be completely avoided, especially since con-
tent analysis and thematic analysis always require a personal interpretation of the data to 
some extent. 
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Another of the limitations of content analysis is that although messages may have dif-
ferent meanings, this method only allows analyzing a few of them through the categori-
zation of data. This is even more relevant when exploring visual and audiovisual con-
tent, as in the case of this study, since there may be many implicit meanings in pictures 
and videos which have remained unappreciated in the analysis process.  
Finally, the scope of this research is quite limited and the findings presented cannot be 
generalized. A broader span of time analyzing the Instagram accounts of the European 
institutions may have been necessary in order to obtain results that could be applied 
more generally. However, analyzing content on Instagram is quite challenging, due to 
the lack of data collection tools available. The difficulties are even bigger when analyz-
ing Stories, since content disappears after 24 hours of its publication, and therefore, this 
situation requires being able to collect the data on a daily basis. Another reason why 
results cannot be generalized is because the sampling of this study is purposive, there-
fore findings cannot be “extrapolated from the sample to the population” (White and 
Marsh, 2006: 37). Nonetheless, this thesis still provides a relevant case study about an 
understudied topic, as is the visual self-presentation of European institutions on social 
media.  
6.4. Implications for further research 
 
The current research has focused exclusively on analyzing visual and audiovisual con-
tent published by European institutions on Instagram. However, other relevant aspects 
of Instagram communication have remained unanalyzed, such as user comments and 
live retransmissions. In further research about EU institutional communication on Insta-
gram, it would be interesting to explore how users connect with the institutions, for ex-
ample through the comments section in regular posts, in order to get a better under-
standing of the interaction between institutions and users. Another interesting feature of 
Instagram is the possibility to broadcast live retransmissions, which include a live chat 
for users. Indeed, during the period of data collection the EC and the EP made use of 
this feature, for example to interview members of the institutions, allowing users to ask 
questions directly to them. Although the use of live retransmissions has remained un-
analyzed in this thesis, it is an interesting feature in terms of enhancing democratic deli-
beration with users. 
69 
 
 
 
On the other hand, comparative research relating the use of Instagram with other social 
media platforms would also be relevant to further explore how European institutions are 
making use of social networks. In Highfield and Leaver’s words, “to study social media 
is not just to study users and networks, content, information, and interactions: it is to 
study the platforms and their contexts, their affordances and changes, including with 
relation to other social media platforms” (2016: 9). For example, relevant questions that 
would help understand the cross-media strategy of European institutions as a whole in-
clude the following: Are institutions using different social media platforms for similar 
purposes or does each platform have a unique purpose? Are they publishing the same 
content on different social media channels or is the content adapted to each platform? 
Does interaction with users unfold in similar ways across different platforms?  
Finally, although this thesis focuses solely on the self-presentation of European institu-
tions on social media, in future research it would be interesting to assess their own 
communication in relation with the image of the EU and the institutions presented in 
mass media, in order to contextualize their social media strategy and get a wider picture 
of the self-presentation of EU institutions online.  
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